SPECIAL SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
AID, DEVELOPMENT, AND EDUCATION

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Editorial Introduction

Special Symposium Issue on Aid, Development, and Education

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The editors of *Current Issues in Comparative Education* are extraordinarily pleased to offer this special symposium issue organized around a seminal discussion by Steven J. Klees, Professor of Education at the University of Maryland, a former president of the Comparative and International Education Society, and a contributor to previous issues of this journal. In his focal article for this issue, “Aid, Development, and Education,” Klees conducts a close reading of recent entries into the burgeoning debate over international aid and development, and then proceeds to set out an articulate and passionate defense of a ‘progressive perspective’ that, he argues, stands in stark opposition to prevailing neoliberal and liberal views. Klees’ essay is followed by four responses – by William C. Brehm and Iveta Silova, Mark Ginsburg, Sangeeta Kamat, and Karen Mundy – that are met in turn with a reply by Klees that aims at giving further elaboration to the progressive perspective.

Klees’ essay on aid, development and education comes at a time when the field of international aid and development has become a site of roiling contention. Certainly, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers have long debated among themselves whether international aid has done much to improve the living conditions and life chances of the world’s billions of poor and impoverished. Efforts to improve “aid effectiveness,” while given fresh impetus over the last decade through the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, are hardly new.

What makes the contemporary period remarkable, however, is the degree of attention and influence that critiques of the aid industry – such as those found in William Easterly’s *The White Man’s Burden* (2006) and especially Dambisa Moyo’s *Dead Aid* (2008) – have managed to gain among broader audiences beyond those within the aid community itself. These critiques have emerged, moreover, just as the field itself has started to witness potentially significant structural transformation, with high-level initiatives such as the U.N. Millennium Development Goals unfolding alongside the emergence of a variety of new actors, ranging from celebrities and internet-fueled philanthropies to emerging economies such as China and Brazil. What these developments suggest is that we are today confronted with a singular opportunity – and perhaps an increasingly urgent moral and political obligation – to re-examine the very premises of international aid and its implications for development, in education and in other sectors and arenas.

As Klees’ essay makes clear, re-examination requires us to go beyond the familiar debates over the machinery of aid delivery – or, to switch to a more frequented metaphor, with the specifics of the current “aid architecture” – to question the fundamental ideological orientations that inform how we interpret past and current global realities, generate diagnoses and prescriptions, and connect these to our projections and hopes for the future. Klees begins his article by reminding us of the horrific scale of the human costs that poverty and inequality continue to exact on the world’s poor and vulnerable. Addressing these problems requires not only that we do ‘more,’ but that we also clarify and adopt a progressive standpoint that makes issues of global justice and equality central to its approach to contemporary development. However, as Klees acknowledges, a progressive voice remains relatively muted in contemporary debates, and he argues in his review of five notable recent books on aid and development – the discussions by Easterly and
Moyo, already mentioned above, as well as Thomas Dichter’s *Despite Good Intentions* (2003), David Ellerman’s *Helping People Help Themselves* (2005), and Roger Riddell’s *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (2007) – that ‘mainstream’ perspectives adhere to either neoliberal prescriptions or propose liberal meliorations that fail to do justice, in both a moral and intellectual sense, to the demands and requirements of genuine, progressive development. While Klees allows that neoliberal and liberal critiques of current aid practices occasionally hit real targets, they are based on a mutual blindness to the fact that contemporary international development was founded and predicated, to a considerable extent, on both neoliberal and liberal premises. Indeed, Klees argues that development initiatives, including the Millennium Development Goals – which is easily the largest coordinated organizational effort there has been in international development – are most profitably understood as situated within a dialectic of “compensatory legitimation.” In this reading, aid is used not to facilitate improvement in the conditions of the world’s poor, but to offer compensation for the effects of the deep and myriad injustices generated by an enduring but fundamentally unjust global order. Only a progressive approach, he suggests, works toward using aid to transform that order rather than to smooth out its internal contradictions.

*What Counts as Genuine Progressivism?*

In the responses that follow Klees’ essay, we find extensive areas of agreement, and sympathy for the idea of a progressive perspective and approach to international aid, development, and education. However, the different authors challenge Klees on several points, and question whether or not he has offered us an adequately progressive understanding of progressivism, so to speak, or has a suitably specified conception of how institutional transformation is possible. For instance, both Mark Ginsburg and Sangeeta Kamat, in their respective responses, challenge Klees to think more deeply about what a radical and not merely progressive transformation of global capitalism and global institutions would be needed in order to achieve the common aims of justice and equality that they, with Klees, wish to uphold and defend. Arguments over labels such as “progressive” and “radical” may seem like semantic quibbles, but these responses raise important questions about the kinds of theoretical lens and conceptual frameworks that are needed to precisely identify potential sources (and obstacles) to deep social transformation. Does a progressivism that attempts to distinguish itself from its liberal and neoliberal opponents mark a genuine advance if it is unable to specify institutional alternatives? Both Ginsburg and Kamat suspect that Klees, despite his fidelity to a progressive orientation, has not accomplished a genuine break from standard liberal efforts to “improve” aid and meliorate the conditions of the world’s poor. In reply, Klees suggests that the differences between his and these ostensibly more radical positions are not as significant as they seem. The argument he articulates here, rather than being read as a fully developed proposal, should instead be seen as a promissory note for additional theoretical – and political – work that is likely to make the commonalities and overlaps between his position and those of Ginsburg and Kamat much clearer.

Somewhat sharper differences become evident in relation to Karen Mundy’s response to Klees. Mundy, like Ginsburg and Kamat, argues that much more needs to be done to specify institutional alternatives to the current international aid system. However, Mundy states, even Klees’ progressive perspective fails to give an adequate account of an apparent paradox: how can development assistance be a part of a system of global inequality and injustice and yet also be a part of a progressive solution? Moreover, there is much that is taking place in the development world today that has not been adequately captured by familiar ideological orientations and political economy arguments. New private and state actors (ranging from the Gates Foundation to celebrity donors and rapidly-developing countries like China) have entered the scene; none seem particularly beholden to ‘old ways’ of carrying out business or conducting aid debates. In view of
such recent and still-ongoing changes in the contemporary aid environment, Klees’ proposals for transforming the existing aid architecture – such as calling for the Bretton Woods institutions (i.e., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) to be replaced or dismantled – seem more rhetorically satisfying than convincing. Klees disagrees, stating that Mundy underestimates the genuine potential contained in a progressive approach, and that the changing membership of the development field cannot count as an adequate argument against its basic claims or orientation.

Implications for Education?
As Klees acknowledges, much of the focus of his discussion is on the first two of the three terms in the title to his article – that is, on aid and development rather than education. But the implications for education should be clear. With the institutionalization of global compacts such as Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals, education has come to occupy a central place in the contemporary international aid system. Billions of dollars now pour each year into funding an array of international, national, and non-governmental organizations working to design, implement, research, and evaluate programs directed at promoting education. But however rhetorically committed the international aid community has been to the ideals of a universal right to education and to the notion of education’s intrinsic value and worth, a notable consequence of these initiatives has been to sanction new forms of global governance – or to use the Foucauldian term, “governmentality” – implemented through time-bound targets, indicators, and benchmarks that place developing countries under onerous burdens and perhaps unsustainable standards and expectations. Under current assessment frameworks and development targets, as Michael Clemens (2004) pointed out in a trenchant analysis, the historically unprecedented rates of progress many countries have achieved in expanding educational access and enrollment have nevertheless been criticized as insufficient or as signs of “failure” by development experts applying global rather than nationally- or contextually-driven standards and criteria.2

In light of these observations, William C. Brehm and Iveta Silova’s “radical reimagining” of aid relationships provides a stimulating point from which to view Klees’s argument. In their essay, Brehm and Silova use Jacques Rancière’s famous discussion of Joseph Jacotot, the ‘ignorant schoolmaster’ who sought to reorient educational and pedagogical practices around a principle of presumed equality, rather than hierarchy, of intelligence and capability between teacher and student. Following Jacotot’s (and Rancière’s) lead, Brehm and Silova suggest that all of the ideological orientations Klees identifies – the progressive perspective included – attempt to create new architectures on the basis of old foundations. However unarticulated, they suggest, current practices in aid and development rest on an implicit sense that the developed world is authorized to dictate to developing countries the kinds of educational objectives and goals they should be pursuing. A more satisfactory approach, perhaps, would be to adopt the stance of an “ignorant donor,” one less willing to instrumentalize education as a means toward economic or other ends, in favor of a system that recognizes genuine equality among all peoples to develop their intrinsic educational potential and values. In response, Klees questions whether or not Brehm and Silova are misinterpreting the progressive position, which would find these ideas congenial.

Conclusion
The debates in these essays are but a single contribution to the multitude of intellectual, practical, and political questions that must be addressed if we, as students, educators, and citizens, wish to persist in our commitment to a more equitable and humane world. Certainly, the future of international aid and development remains difficult to predict with any great sense of assurance or certainty. However, the editors of CICE are thankful to Steven Klees and his respondents for helping to make some of the possibilities in front of us much clearer.
Acknowledgments
I wish to offer special thanks to CICE editors Ryan Hathaway and Michelle Hollett for their invaluable assistance in putting this issue together. I also thank CICE managing editor Matthew Hayden for his continued support and encouragement during the editorial process, as well as Steve Klees for his contribution to this issue and for his long-standing support of this journal.

Endnotes
1. As development economist Owen Barder (2009) reminds us, the Pearson Commission’s 1969 report, Partners in Development, came to many of the same recommendations – such as untying aid and improving coordination among aid donors and recipients – that can be found in current prescriptions and objectives incorporated into the ‘aid effectiveness’ agendas of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2011).
2. Similarly, Easterly (2009) makes this point with respect to the MDGs and Africa, pointing out that indicators and metrics used to assess progress toward the MDGs place the most disadvantaged countries, mainly in Africa, under disproportionally burdensome expectations that cause even historically significant progress to be interpreted as indications of “failure.”

References


Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden: Why the west’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin Press.


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Aid, Development, and Education

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Our world faces pervasive poverty and inequality:

- the world’s rich-poor gap has more than doubled since the 1960s;
- 1.4 billion people live on less than $1.25/day;
- hunger affects 963 million people worldwide;
- nearly 1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water;
- one in three children in developing countries suffers from malnutrition;
- about 75 million children who should be in primary school are not; and
- every year, nearly 10 million children under the age of 5 die from preventable causes.

(Bread for the World, 2009; UNESCO, 2009; Dichter, 2003, p. 1)

Hundreds of billions of dollars in international aid have been given or loaned to developing countries though bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, at least, ostensibly, in order to do something about these and other problems. Has such aid helped?

Debates around this question have been ongoing for decades, perhaps intensifying in recent years. This should not be a surprise. It is far from straightforward to even determine how to investigate the question. At first glance, a researcher might want to look before and after to observe how well indicators, such as of poverty and economic growth, improved over a specific time period, and link that to changes in aid, controlling for other factors that might affect poverty and economic growth. While some research along these lines exists, this approach is generally a non-starter, especially on a global level, but also even for specific countries. The question is just too complicated to be well-specified – for many reasons. For instance, there is a myriad of interactive factors that affect poverty and economic growth besides aid. Moreover, international aid serves many purposes other than these, such as supporting the foreign policy of rich countries, building nations, democratization, or fighting terrorism. Given that a supposedly ‘scientific’ approach cannot answer the question of the impact of aid, it is not surprising that the debates about it rely heavily on anecdotal and idiosyncratic evidence marshaled from particular ideological perspectives.

Periodic studies and international meetings have reviewed aid and development linkages and made recommendations for improvement. For example, the World Bank-sponsored Pearson Commission in 1970 argued that “external resources, by adding to the resources available to a developing country, has had a positive impact upon development” and merits “large and sustained expansion” (Asante, 1985, p. 249). Subsequent studies like the Brandt Commission Reports in 1980 and 1983 reinforced these conclusions. In recent years, international meetings – Monterrey in 2002, Rome in 2003, Marrakech in 2004, and Paris in 2005 – led to agreements on aid and development. The G-8 meeting in Scotland in 2005, with impetus from celebrity donors and entrepreneurial philanthropists, promised a doubling of aid to African nations. And perhaps most importantly, the Paris Declaration in 2005 lays out an international agenda to improve foreign aid.
by making it more transparent, accountable, aligned, harmonized, and effective.

Despite the fact that most of these official views of aid end up arguing that more is necessary, foreign aid has long had its critics from all sides of the political spectrum. For example, from the right, Peter Bauer, an early neoliberal economist writing before the term “neoliberal” was even coined, published in 1972 a book called *Dissent on Development* that summarized the critique he had been making for many years. He argued that rather than helping, “foreign aid...is likely to obstruct” development (p. 95) by creating dependency, distorting priorities, fostering corruption, and exacerbating market imperfections. His recommendation was to mostly eliminate foreign aid. This has also been a long-term political position of the neoconservative movement in the United States, as exemplified by the media commentator and former Presidential candidate, Patrick Buchanan (1998).

A strong critique of foreign aid has come from some on the left as well. For example, in his classic article on dependency, Frank (1967) argues that foreign aid is a form of neocolonialism. Samir Amin (1980), in his book, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World*, argues the need for developing countries to delink from world trade and aid systems in order to focus on internal needs. Amin does not argue that trade and aid should be eliminated, just reduced.

It is not my purpose to do a historical analysis of the state of aid and development. I do wish to give a sense of current debates on the topic and then conclude by offering some of my own views. In my review of the literature on aid and development, five recent books stood out as repeatedly discussed and referenced. I therefore examine briefly each of these works, trying to provide a sense of each author’s argument in his or her own words. The first three books mostly offer neoliberal perspectives, while the last two come from more liberal and progressive perspectives. I follow this examination with a discussion of their views and conclude with my own views on aid and development, including implications for education. This paper spends more time on aid and development issues than on education, in part, because I found I could not sensibly discuss education issues without first examining the debates about aid and development and their broader implications.

**Current Debates**

**Thomas Dichter**

Thomas Dichter’s 2003 book is entitled *Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World Has Failed*. As you might suspect, Dichter is a big fan of Peter Bauer, the early neoliberal economist I mentioned above. Dichter is an anthropologist who spent much of his life in the development business – as a Peace Corps volunteer and country director, a foundation officer, a think tank staff member, and a consultant for such agencies as UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank. While he recognizes that different political perspectives may want to use some of his arguments, he sees himself as taking a “pragmatic” stance (p. xi). The book is unusual in that for each analytical chapter, there is a parallel chapter that is actually a short story based on the daily lives of development workers.

Dichter’s (2003) main argument is

that aid has become a business whose main stake is its own survival – [which] begins to explain why there has been so little apparent learning or fundamental change in how things are done, despite all the evidence of failure, all the studies...
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and the many expensive evaluations and retrospective looks at this half century of work, the majority of which show depressing if not always negative results. (p. 4)

For Dichter, development is “staggeringly complex” (p. 191). He elaborates:

Development is not a set of obstinate problems the way cancer is but a historical process that cannot really be engineered or controlled. In short, development is not a “challenge,” something we can deliberately “attack” the way finding a cure for cancer can be. Certainly, an industry set up to engineer change through a series of short- and medium-term direct interventions (“projects” and “programs”) is, to put it mildly, a gross mismatch of means and ends. (p. 9)

He goes on (p. 185, 191):

Development professionals continue to hedge the question of whether development assistance is about doing things. Increasingly, we know that the real keys to development are neither tangible nor involve much “doing.” They are about institutions, attitudes, laws, and human resources.... [Rather than engineering] we could instead undertake more subtle and indirect interventions, stimulating, encouraging, and cajoling.

Dichter, like most of the other critics discussed below, does not deny that there are aid and development success stories:

For example, more access to primary education has resulted in more people with basic literacy and under the World Health Organization a decade-long effort to wipe out smallpox succeeded. In the 1990s for the first time we see a decline in the fertility rate of the developing countries owing to a lowering of infant mortality and a decrease in death rates. (p. 2)

But for Dichter these are the exceptions. His concluding chapter is entitled “The Case for a Radical Reduction in Development Assistance.” He elaborates:

Does this mean that we say, “Well, then, let’s leave well enough alone, let them (the poor of developing nations) be. Let the forces of the international marketplace bring on development. Let globalization reign”...Yes, it might mean that. (p. 10)

But Dichter insists his conclusion is not “gloomy” (p. 10). His sources for hope are the potential for telecommunications, the migration of the poor towards better opportunities, and the overall workings of the market and the private sector in the interests of development. While acknowledging the continued need for humanitarian assistance, he nevertheless concludes: “It is time for us to entertain the serious possibility that development assistance is not necessary for development” (p. 293).

William Easterly
The title of William Easterly’s 2006 book is The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and So Little Good. As you might suspect, Easterly is also a big fan of Bauer. Easterly is also well-known as a critic of economic orthodoxy who was pushed out of the Bank because of his dissenting, more liberal, opinions. But in this book, Easterly the critic of
economic orthodoxy is less evident than Easterly the believer in market solutions. He offers a strong critique of international aid as a

tragedy in which the West spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid over the last five decades and still had not managed to get twelve-cent medicines to children to prevent half of all malaria deaths. The West spent $2.3 trillion and still had not managed to get four-dollar bed nets to poor families....The West spent $2.3 trillion and Amartech [an Ethiopian girl] is still carrying firewood and not going to school. (p.4)

He also sees the failure as rooted in the inherent problems with planning and social engineering:

Let’s call the advocates of the traditional approach [to foreign aid] the Planners while we call the agents for change in ...[my] alternative approach the Searchers. The short answer on why dying poor children don’t get twelve-cent medicines, while healthy rich people do get Harry Potter [delivered around the world overnight], is that twelve-cent medicines are supplied by Planners while Harry Potter is supplied by Searchers.

This is not to say that everything should be turned over to the free market that produced and distributed Harry Potter. The poorest people in the world have no money to motivate market Searchers to meet their desperate need. However, the mentality of Searchers in markets is a guide to a constructive approach to foreign aid. (p. 5)

While Easterly exhibits a liberal’s sensitivity to issues of equity, it is integrated in an extremely neoliberal faith in the working of markets and a corresponding belief in the problematic nature of government, as exemplified in the quotes above and in the title of the fifth chapter, “The Rich Have Markets, The Poor Have Bureaucrats.”

In the end, Easterly recommends a much reduced role and scope for foreign aid. He suggests that aid be oriented towards programs that seek to have a direct and concrete impact on the poor, and away from broad goals like development and broad policies like structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and poverty reduction strategy plans (PRSPs). He concludes with principles for on-the-ground assistance:

...If you want to aid the poor, then:

1. Have aid agents individually accountable for individual, feasible areas for action that help poor people lift themselves up.
2. Let those agents search for what works, based on past experience in their area.
3. Experiment, based on the results of the search. (Easterly, 2006, p. 382)

Easterly provides additional principles that focus on the need for evaluation results to govern rewards and penalties, tying these incentives to aid agent actions.

**Dambisa Moyo**

Dambisa Moyo’s (2009) recent and hotly debated book is entitled *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (for some debate, see King, 2009b). Moyo is a young Zambian economist, educated at Harvard and Oxford Universities, who has spent two years...
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working at the World Bank and eight at Goldman Sachs. She is another Peter Bauer fan; in fact, the book is dedicated to him, and her dismal argument echoes his:

[H]as more than US $1 trillion in development assistance over the last several decades made African people better off? No. In fact, across the globe the recipients of this aid are worse off; much worse off. Aid has helped make the poor poorer, and growth slower. Yet aid remains a centerpiece of today’s development policy and one of the biggest ideas of our time.

The notion that aid can alleviate systemic poverty, and has done so, is a myth. Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not ended but increased. Aid has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world….

[Countries get]... trapped in a vicious circle of corruption, market distortion, and further poverty – and thus the ‘need’ for more aid. [Moyo, 2009, p. xix]

Moyo does make clear that she is talking about official development assistance (ODA) only, not humanitarian aid. Her argument that aid is not just “innocuous” but actually “malignant” (p. 47) rests on attributing to aid a host of ills: most especially, fostering corruption, but also diminishing social capital, increasing conflict, decreasing savings and investments, increasing inflation, hurting exports, and increasing bottlenecks. The result is a culture of “aid-dependency” or “addiction” (pp. 66, 75) that is fostered by what we might call an international aid complex employing half a million people. This complex generates “pressure to lend” (p. 54) and “engenders laziness on the part of African policymakers…in remedying Africa’s critical woes” (p. 66). Contrary to many researchers’ calls for more democracy as part of a solution to these problems, Moyo argues:

The uncomfortable truth is that far from being a prerequisite for economic growth, democracy can hamper development as democratic regimes find it difficult to push through economically beneficial legislation….In a perfect world, what poor countries at the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a multi-party democracy, but in fact a decisive benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving…. (p. 42)

The evidence Moyo uses to support her arguments are almost wholly anecdotal and correlational, and the rationale is that of a neoliberal economist convinced of the necessity of market solutions. As Moyo says:

It should come as no surprise that the Dead Aid prescriptions are market-based, since no economic ideology other than one rooted in the movement of capital and competition has succeeded in getting the greatest numbers of people out of poverty in the fastest time” (p. 145).

Moyo concludes by calling for a complete phase-out of ODA over a 5 to 10 year period. A number of market-based prescriptions are offered as ways to replace, in a more productive manner, the capital that would be lost: borrowing on international capital markets; attracting more foreign direct investment (China’s activities in this sphere are praised); promoting trade; expanding microloans; facilitating remittances; incentivizing savings; and employing conditional cash transfers.
Moyo, in the end, asks, “What would happen?” if her recommendations were put into effect:

Would many more millions in Africa die from poverty and hunger? Probably not...Isn’t it more likely that in a world freed of aid, economic life for the majority of Africans might actually improve, that corruption would fall, entrepreneurs would rise and Africa’s growth engine would start chugging? This is the most probable outcome.... (pp. 144-145).

Roger Riddell

Roger Riddell’s 2007 book, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, has no subtitle, thus intentionally depriving us of the “sound-bite” (p. xvii) summary present in the other books. Riddell is an economist and development specialist who is currently International Director for Christian Aid, a major U.K. relief and development agency. Riddell has worked in the development industry for three decades, half of which was spent at Britain’s Overseas Development Institute. He is the author of previous studies on foreign aid.

This book differs from the others in a number of ways. First, in addition to a focus on ODA, it also looks closely at humanitarian and emergency aid and at aid provided by NGOs. Second, it considers providing aid within a human rights framework. Third, it offers the most detailed review of foreign aid and of studies of its impact.

The degree to which aid is tied to political and commercial interests is emphasized. For example, of the roughly $100 billion in ODA in 2005, fully 40% went for technical assistance (p. 202) and 60% was tied to spending in the donor country (p. 358). Riddell points out how much aid follows donor country political interests, as exemplified by the amount of aid devoted by the U.S. to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He spends time examining the Washington Consensus and loan conditionalities, and offers a trenchant critique of the concept of “country ownership” in practice:

Predominantly for the IMF and...World Bank, ownership is understood as the process whereby recipient countries come round to accepting...the respective financial institution’s programmes, policies, and approaches to development, growth, and poverty reduction. (pp. 240-241)

After an exhaustive review of empirical studies, Riddell concludes with a much more balanced view than the other books examined here:

Does aid really work? Earlier parts of this book have reviewed the best available evidence to conclude that large amounts of development and emergency aid have saved lives, both directly and indirectly. They have led to tangible benefits for millions of poor people, and made some positive wider contributions to poor-country economies and societies. Some aid interventions, however, have been failures, and large amounts of development aid have not had a significant, long-term, systemic, or sustainable impact. Emergency aid has succeeded in saving many lives, but lives have been lost because of a shortage of funds. The failure to coordinate the humanitarian response effectively has meant that much aid has been wasted, while large numbers of those caught up in emergencies and disaster remain inadequately protected. (p. 355)
An earlier passage focused on ODA makes the author’s position clearer, reinforcing the point I raised at the beginning of this article:

But has most official development aid worked, or failed? The honest answer is that we still don’t know – not for lack of trying, but due to the inherent difficulties of tracing its contribution. After more than five decades of aid-giving, the bulk of the most reliable and accessible information on impact relates to discrete projects, supplemented in the last decade by some assessments of the contribution made by individual donors in particular countries. Cross-country studies seeking to find the answer to the question “Does aid work?” do not provide a reliable guide on the overall and explicit contribution of aid to development and poverty reduction. They never will. (p. 254)

Towards the end of the book, Riddell summarizes the five fundamental problems he sees with the current system of aid:

1. Aid is still not provided in sufficient overall quantities to meet the different needs of poor countries.…
2. The aid which is provided is not allocated in any systematic, rational, or efficient way to those who need it most.…
3. The aggregate amounts of aid provided to recipient countries are volatile and unpredictable.…
4. Development aid relationships are still dominated by recipients having to interact with scores, and, at the extreme, hundreds of different official donors and donor agencies… [and] many thousands of individual projects and programmes.…
5. While donors regularly articulate the centrality of recipient ownership and partnership between donors and recipients as critical for aid to have a positive impact, in practice, the overall aid relationship remains extremely lopsided with donors remaining almost wholly in control. (pp. 386-7)

In his two concluding chapters, Riddell boldly proposes an overhaul of the entire aid architecture. This new structure would take a lot of the current politics out of aid distribution, using a “human rights approach to development…which gives prominence to the involvement and participation of recipients in decisions about how aid should be used.…” (p. 390). For official development assistance, a new International Aid Office and Fund would be financed by compulsory contributions from rich countries and allocated by need with transparent criteria operationalized by a technical staff in each country. In the case of severely inadequate or corrupt governments, alternative distribution mechanisms would be used. For humanitarian aid, current improvements in coordination and central funding would be extended. And for NGOs, codes of conduct and other efforts would make their work more transparent and productive.

David Ellerman

David Ellerman’s 2005 book, Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance, also critiques the ‘big push’ social engineering side of foreign aid and offers in its stead a model based on incrementalism and self-help. Ellerman is an ex-World Bank staffer who, before retiring from the agency, was an advisor to Joseph Stiglitz and other World Bank chief economists. Ellerman was an internal Bank critic and now has become an external one. Much of the book draws on his experiences with the Bank, mostly as examples of what not to do.
Ellerman (2005, p. xvii) highlights the general lack of debate within the Bank and describes the “usual Bank procedure of trying to give…the answers” buttressed by an intimidating barrage of one-side arguments and biased statistics.” With respect to the Bank’s attempt to be a “Knowledge Bank,” he argues that it “should take a cue from universities and other scientific institutions and not have ‘official views’ on complex questions of knowledge.” In an earlier paper (Klees, 2002), I argued that the Bank wasn’t really a Knowledge Bank but a Monopoly Opinion Bank (a.k.a., the MOB!). Ellerman seems to agree:

One might think that all the economists in positions of power in the Bank would recall their catechisms about the problem of monopoly. But it would seem that they are more attracted to the notion of “global” than they are repelled by the notion of “monopoly.” All the rhetoric about a global agency having a global role to gather global knowledge to solve global problems seems to be so much globaloney to justify the monopolistic worldwide role of the World Bank. (p. 242)

Ellerman reveals how the “thought police” in the Bank and the IMF restrict debate and promote a party line (p. xix, 153). He also warns how the ubiquitous call for “country ownership” of its policies and programs can be perverted, “turning the government into a marionette that will believe and do what it is told as long as the aid or loan is forthcoming” (p. 136).

However, the problems Ellerman (2005, p.2) sees go far beyond the Bank: “the development of whole societies must surely be one of the most complex tasks facing humanity.” He says:

After a half century on the path of official development assistance, we find ourselves lost….Development will not yield to social engineering no matter how much aid is provided. A fundamentally different philosophy of development assistance is needed… (p. 241)

That fundamentally different philosophy for Ellerman means rethinking the relations between ‘helpers’ and ‘doers.’

Helping or assistance is a relationship between those offering assistance in some form, the helper or helpers, and those receiving the assistance, the doer or doers. The helpers could be individuals, NGOs, or official bilateral or multilateral development agencies and the doers could be individuals, organizations, or various levels of government in the developing countries. (p. 4)

Ellerman’s (pp. 253-61) different philosophy is summed up in five “do” and “don’t” principles:

First Do: Starting from Where the Doers Are…
Second Do: Seeing Through the Doers’ Eyes…
First Don’t: Don’t Try to Impose Change on Doers…
Second Don’t: Don’t Give Help as Benevolence…
Third Do: Respect Autonomy of Doers

The book closes with the following remark (p. 252):

Helpers cannot and should not try “to do development.” Helpers can at best use indirect, enabling, and autonomy-respecting methods to bring doers to the
threshold. The doers have to do the rest on their own in order to make it their own. The doers acquire development only as the fruits of their own labor.

Discussion
So, what are we to make of all this? Clearly, all the authors offer some dismal analyses and depressing conclusions. Of course, this is not surprising given the current state of global poverty and inequality. One would have hoped that 60 years of international aid would have led to clear improvement. However, the best that anyone can say is that the situation could have been a lot worse than it is now had there been no aid. And only Riddell makes this argument explicitly.

However, these books do differ from one another. I find it useful to divide the world of political economy into three broad paradigms: neoliberal, liberal, and progressive. Neoliberalism, which predominates today, focuses on market solutions, criticizing the efficiency and equity of government interventions. A liberal perspective offers greater recognition of the inefficiencies and inequities of markets and puts more faith in government. Finally, a progressive perspective, focuses on the reproductive nature of both the market and the state under current world system structures like capitalism, patriarchy, and racism, and puts greater reliance on transformation from below through more participatory forms of democracy and collective action. It should be noted that these paradigms are more continuous and overlapping than mutually exclusive.

The predominant argument in these books – in particular, those by Dichter, Moyo and, to a large extent, Easterly – is neoliberal. Aid is seen as having been almost a complete waste at best, if not an unmitigated disaster, while the solution lies in minimizing government and maximizing free markets and trade. This is not surprising either, given that for the last three decades a neoliberal view has dominated in much of the world. As Moyo (2009, p. 67) points out, in the liberal era of the 1960s and 1970s (when government intervention enjoyed much greater legitimacy), Peter Bauer was a “lone dissenting voice,” while his views now have wider support. But, it is very interesting to note that, in practice, this support is rather ambiguous. While Dichter, Moyo, Easterly, and other neoliberal commentators on the problems of aid have received a lot of attention, it is well to remember that neoliberals have generally been in charge for the last three decades during the biggest build-up in international aid the world has ever seen. Neoliberals have been in charge while the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – perhaps the most sweeping call for aid and social engineering in history – were instituted. At least on the surface, this implies that many neoliberals have maintained some belief in the efficacy of aid – or perhaps it is a result of neoliberal guilt given the worsening of poverty and inequality caused by their policies.

Or perhaps there is something else operating here. As a progressive political economist, critical of both neoliberals and liberals, I see the neocolonial dimensions of aid in the world system, as Frank (1967) pointed out. From this perspective, international aid and the MDGs are a form of what Weiler (1984) called compensatory legitimation; more colloquially, I see it as a form of “good cop, bad cop.” International crises, shaky and poorly-performing economies, increasing poverty and inequality, widespread conflicts, and the equivalent of structural adjustment policies everywhere, all call into question the legitimacy of the neoliberal social order – this is the bad cop. To compensate for this, actors in the world system of neoliberal globalization must introduce polices such as aid and the MDGs that are aimed at ameliorating some problematic conditions and thus restoring system legitimacy – this is the good cop.

This argument does not question the good intentions of the proponents of these policies, but it does question their effects. Put simply, the existence of these policies may be sufficient for
compensatory legitimation; whether they are effective seems to be less important. All of the books I reviewed were written before the current economic crisis. This crisis changes things in that it calls into more serious question the entire neoliberal regime and poses a global challenge to its legitimacy. For the first time in three decades, whether neoliberalism will survive is not clear. If it does, however, it will probably not be a time for policymakers to heed the calls of people like Dichter, Moyo, and Easterly, as even greater compensatory legitimation will be needed. The world system must look like something is being done to improve the situation even if it is not.

I do not mean to argue that all policies are the result of systemic forces that reproduce and legitimate the unequal word order. I am a firm believer that neoliberal policies are continually challenged by individuals, organizations, social movements, and left-of-center governments. The existence of aid and the MDGs represents real gains for the world’s disenfranchised, as does, for example, the more participatory processes called for in PRSPs. However, in this neoliberal era, these policies unfortunately bear little fruit.

It is interesting to note that one could make the argument that aid was more successful in the liberal era of the 1960s and 1970s than it has been in the neoliberal era that followed. Even Moyo (2009, p. 5) admits that Africa was doing much better in the 1970s than today, and it was “awash” with aid then. A big difference is that the 1980s introduced neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) throughout Africa, cutting government and liberalizing trade. Even many neoliberal economists admitted these policies had harmful, if not devastating, consequences. Yet current-day mechanisms such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) continue to produce results that look very similar to those produced by the bankrupt SAPs.

Riddell and Ellerman proceed from a predominantly liberal perspective, although both have some progressive elements. Riddell is very critical of aid and its ties to commercial and political interests, but he recognizes that much aid has had a positive impact. His conclusion for increasing aid and restructuring aid architecture offers some progressive alternatives worth considering. Ellerman also critiques the structure of aid and the ability of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank to socially engineer a better world. His solution, to rely more on respecting the autonomous efforts of the “doers,” especially at the grassroots level, fits with a more progressive perspective.

My reading of additional literature related to aid and development indicates to me that these five books are representative of the debate. A neoliberal perspective predominates. Liberal views are reasonably represented, especially if you include works that are indirectly about aid and development (e.g., Collier, 2007; Sachs, 2005). Scarcer are works from a progressive perspective. In an excellent paper from this point of view, Samoff (2009) comes to quite different conclusions than the authors above: the aid system “is in fact working very well. Its essential role is not to achieve publicly stated objectives but rather to maintain a global political economy of inequality” (p. 24).

I agree with Samoff. But, as I am sure he would agree, this is not a call for despair. It is a call for transformation. I believe, as do many who share a progressive perspective, that that transformation will have to come from widespread collective action. Part of that action is thinking about and discussing what such transformation might entail. In what follows, I offer my own perspectives on certain key steps that need to be taken with regard to aid, development, and education.
Implications for Aid, Development, and Education

Much more money is needed.
In today’s world, it has become fashionable to say ‘don’t throw money at social problems,’ ‘money is not the main issue,’ and ‘better management and stronger accountability is what is needed to fix the problem.’ This mentality has been an excuse for inaction. Of course more money is needed, much more. Total ODA per capita comes to about $10. What kind of development do we think we can buy for $10 per head per year? Rich countries spend less than 1% of their GDP on ODA. They are unwilling to even come close to the 0.7% of GDP goal that they set for themselves. In this unfair and vastly unequal world, what kind of development do we think we can buy for less than a measly 1% of GDP? In 2008, ODA to all of Africa was about $35 billion, less than the U.S. bailout of the auto industry; Stephen Lewis calls this amount of aid “picayune and marginal” (Aurea Foundation, 2009).

It is worth noting that the Marshall Plan for reconstruction after WWII spent as much on Europe as the rich countries do on total ODA for all developing countries now (Moyo, 2009, p. 12). On a per capita basis, the Marshall Plan received about 8 times as much money as ODA receives now. And for Europe the development problem was much easier than that faced by developing countries today: Europe was already industrialized with an educated workforce; it only needed to rebuild the physical infrastructure damaged in the war. Developing countries need a much more intense effort than the Marshall Plan. The point is that we haven’t been throwing money at our social problems; instead we’ve been miserly. In a similar vein, King (2009b, pp. 8-9) points out the huge amount of aid – perhaps more than what has gone to all of Africa – that went to transform one country, South Korea, and the great amount of resources that Germany is putting into the development of the former East Germany.

Attempts to cost what it would take to achieve the MDGs have produced estimates of at least an additional $120 to $190 billion a year, and that may well be an underestimation (UN Millennium Project, 2006; Moyo, 2009, p.45). It needs to be remembered and highlighted that whether you as an individual are in need of these resources is simply an accident of birth. In today’s world, shouldn’t we work towards making the accident of where you are born an illegitimate basis for determining your well-being? For a long time, I have thought of doing a study in the U.S. of the vast differences in the investment we make in the children of the rich versus the children of the poor. This would involve looking at family, school, and social investments – everything from prenatal care to home environments to college. While quantifying all of that would be difficult, my guess is the results would be astounding, showing differences of 500 or 1,000 to 1. Imagine how much greater would be the disparity between the investment in a rich child in the U.S. and a poor child in Africa – perhaps as much as 10,000 to 1. Whatever the numbers, these huge differences should be seen as completely illegitimate and immoral. Much more aid is needed.

Education, like other social sectors, has been a victim of the neoliberal onslaught that has argued that schools generally do not need more money but need to spend it more wisely (Kløes, 2008a). What nonsense! Of course, spending wisely is important, but more money is desperately needed. We have 75 million children of primary school age out of school (UNESCO, 2009). They need teachers, classrooms, and learning materials. Universal primary education and other EFA goals are estimated to require an additional $16 billion per year (UNESCO, 2010). The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) has only been supplying about $300 million per year. Moreover, we have many more millions of students receiving a very low quality primary education who need more and better educated teachers, improved facilities, and better learning materials. This does not include
the huge secondary school coverage deficit. Furthermore, the problem is not limited to developing countries. In the U.S., for example, there is a huge achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged children, and that is a direct result of the huge investment gap that starts at birth, as I discussed earlier.

**Disburse some of that money directly to the poor.**

Just as she is putting the finishing touches on her argument to eliminate all aid, Moyo (2009) somewhat surprisingly suggests the idea of giving aid by direct cash transfers to the poor:

> Instead of writing out a single US$250 million cheque to a country’s government, why not distribute the money equally among its population,” [incorporating] notions of accountability and repayment….It is worth pointing out that there has been some notable success with a concept known as ‘conditional cash transfers’; these are cash payments…[incorporating] notions of accountability and repayment….It is worth pointing out that there has been some notable success with a concept known as ‘conditional cash transfers’; these are cash payments…made to give the poor an incentive to perform tasks that could help them escape poverty (for example, good school attendance, working a certain number of hours, improving test scores, seeing a doctor). The idea of conditional cash transfers has met with much success in developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru… studies show the schemes have been instrumental in decreasing malnutrition, increasing school attendance, and decreasing child labour…[W]hy has this type of programme not been rolled out aggressively across Africa? (pp. 150-151)

Conditional cash transfers are now touted by the Bank and other agencies, but they are not rolled out because donors are not willing to put up the money to do so. Riddell also concludes with a couple of pages arguing for cash transfers. He, like I, would question Moyo’s argument that all money should be distributed this way and that it need be repaid (these are not microloans). Riddell contends:

For many years, humanitarian agencies have handed out goods free to those in need during emergencies, especially food. More recently, both humanitarian and other aid agencies have given food aid in return for work and, more recently, cash for work. However, very little aid has been provided for those in need simply as ‘free cash’ enabling people to spend it as they think fit. Though increasingly wishing to make a tangible difference to very poor people, donors have shied away from providing cash for extreme poverty. Historically a reluctance to give cash directly to poor people has often been based on the belief that they will spend it…[unwisely]… and on the linked paternalistic, and condescending, view that poor people do not know how best to use it. These beliefs sit uncomfortably alongside the increasingly mainstream view that beneficiary choice and participation are fundamental to the aid relationship. (p. 407)

Riddell goes on to review the evidence for the effectiveness of cash transfers and argues the case is “compelling” (p. 407). In the 1970s, there was a much discussed development strategy called “equity before growth,” which argued that the traditional approach that relied on growth before eventually achieving greater equity was ineffective, and had it backwards: global redistribution was needed first to direct growth in different ways and especially towards the needs of the disadvantaged. Neoliberals came to power before this strategy had gained much traction, but it remains a much more sensible approach to development. Resources redistributed to the poor can help re-direct the economy towards their needs and, when combined with job creation efforts, can help set up a self-sustaining system.
Some of the research mentioned above praising conditional cash transfers is in education. There are small- and large-scale programs in developing countries (e.g., Brazil and Mexico) that pay poor children to go to school, conditional on attendance and passing. Given the persistence of user fees and the very large opportunity costs of child labor faced by poor parents, offering scholarships such as these on a very large scale will be the only way to achieve UPE. The costs of doing so are not included in the UPE cost estimates above, raising the amount of money needed considerably if the MDGs and EFA goals are to be taken seriously.

Real and strong participation should be the fundamental basis for governance.

Moyo (2009) comments on the “rise of glamour aid” in which actors, rock stars, and the like become very visible proponents of aid:

> Scarcely does one see Africa’s (elected) officials or those African policymakers charged with the development portfolio offer an opinion on what should be done, or what might actually work to save the continent....This very important responsibility has, for all intents and purposes, and to the bewilderment and chagrin of many an African, been left to musicians who reside outside Africa. (pp. 26-27)

While I see some value to “glamour aid,” Moyo’s point is well-taken. Who or what directs and should direct the aid system? There is much talk of “country ownership.” The bilateral and multilateral aid agencies all claim that the country is in charge and that they only have an advisory role. But that is simply not true, as Riddell’s earlier quote makes clear. The aid agencies have overwhelming power in the aid relationship, specifically through the conditionalities they require and generally through the power to withhold and direct aid. This power is even greater under the currently fashionable SWApS (sector wide approaches) through which the gang of donors effectively makes country policy. For aid to be effective, we must curtail the power of aid agencies and move beyond country ownership to rely on widespread participation.

Participation in aid processes by the disadvantaged themselves and their advocates in civil society has long been discussed. Instrumental, idiosyncratic, and sporadic uses of participation have been common. But it is rare that participation takes on real and strong roles in governance. The rhetoric is often lofty, but the reality is weak. For example, the formulation of poverty reduction strategy papers (PSRPs) that are supposed to guide all World Bank and IMF aid to a country in principle require extensive participation by civil society. In practice, consultation replaces participation, and the consultation is hurried and superficial, with civil society having hardly any say in the final product. As mentioned earlier, the final result are policies that bear strong similarities to the draconian and unsuccessful SAPs.

This call for serious participation in the governance of public policies and programs is a call for reform in rich countries as much as for reform in poor countries and global interrelationships. Representative democracy has had many positive features, but it has led to a system that is strongly reproductive, protecting the interests of the advantaged at the expense of the disadvantaged. Under labels of ‘participatory,’ ‘deliberative,’ and ‘strong democracy,’ there have been many calls for reform in line with what I am calling for here (Crocker, 2009; Barber, 2003).

Neoliberalism strongly promotes privatization, including in the education sector. Calls for voucher schemes and subsidizing and strengthening private schooling have been ubiquitous. Neoliberals consider relying on the market as a form of participation. What nonsense! There was
an economics textbook entitled *Participation without Politics* that was a typical microeconomic examination of a supposed free market system (Brittan, 1979). There is no participation without politics; participation is inherently political. As in all development endeavors, education needs much deeper and more widespread forms of participation. At their best, they connect with a broad approach to critical pedagogy governing the administration, content, and process of education, such as with the Citizen School movement in Brazil (Fischman and Gandin, 2007; Gandin and Apple, 2002).

*Replace the World Bank and the IMF.*

The Bank and the Fund are completely ideological institutions. Even insiders point to the internal “thought police” who reinforce orthodoxy and suppress dissent. For the last three decades, that ideology has been neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has been a total failure in terms of development and has resulted in the most incredible concentration of wealth the world has ever seen. It was a failure before the current economic crisis, and now that failure is even more apparent. Liberal and progressive economists have had hardly any voice in the Bank or the Fund since the 1970s. Neither have non-economists, civil society, or developing countries. The result has been three decades of bad, one-sided advice.

Clearly the Bank and the Fund have functions that need to be fulfilled, in particular, giving grants and loans for development and for economic crises. But we need an entirely new architecture for doing so, perhaps partly along the lines Riddell has suggested. Given the fundamental debates among economists, one school of economic thought should not dominate as it does now. Moreover, given that economic issues shade into all sorts of other social issues, economists should not be in charge. In keeping with my previous point, governance should be participatory, with developing countries and civil society having a considerable say. The Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, even though it is housed within the Bank, offers one example of an attempt to develop a more participatory and consensus-based process.

Ideally, much of ODA would be channeled through a new aid architecture, reducing considerably the multiplicity of demands on developing countries from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. Riddell (2007, p. 360) points out: “Each year, over 35,000 separate official aid transactions take place and, on average, each aid recipient has to deal with more than 25 different official donors” (also see Knack and Rahman, 2008). Working in developing countries, one is simply amazed by the proliferation of aid-funded projects, the contradictions between them, and the incredible demands they put on local agencies in implementation and monitoring.

I believe future historians will shake their collective head in wonder that the world today allowed a bank to be the global leader in developing and enforcing educational policy. What nonsense! We need to get rid of the Bank and the Fund. The Fund is perhaps the biggest obstacle to Education for All (EFA) in the world today as its narrow inflation targets lead it to require developing countries to cut their teaching force as a way of scaling back government (Rowden, 2010; Marphatia, Moussie, Ainger, and Archer, 2007; Archer, 2006). The Bank’s Fast Track Initiative has been useful in getting some money to some countries to help with EFA costs, but far too little money has been allocated, the process has been cumbersome and slow and subject to endless Bank regulation, and the Bank has imposed arbitrary educational benchmarks on who should qualify for funds (Benavot, et al. 2010; Klees, Winthrop, and Adams, 2010; Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd., and Oxford Policy Management, 2009). There has been a call to replace FTI with a Global Fund for Education (even endorsed at one point by President Obama) (Oxfam, 2010; Sperling, 2009). It is high time. The Bank’s ideological role as global education cop must end.
There are global development priorities that might be agreed upon.
This paper is mostly about the aid process. Arguing for a much more participatory process does not mean development becomes chaotic or strictly locally-determined. There may well be some global priorities that could be agreed upon. My suggestions for some of these are as follows:

- **Impact the poor:** Clearly, we want to do a much better job of having aid reach its intended beneficiaries.
- **Emphasize gender:** The inequalities and discrimination faced by girls and women are unjust and have been a major barrier to development.
- **Go to scale:** We have had thousands of very effective pilot projects at a local level, often run by NGOs; we need to implement many of them on a large scale.
- **Consider the environment:** We are facing a global ecological crisis, and aid requires an integral examination of its impact on the environment.
- **Pay attention to issues of peace and conflict:** Over 40 countries are in a state of conflict or post-conflict, and we live in a world where aggression is ubiquitous (Fischer, n.d.).
- **Use a human rights framework:** We have many United Nations agreements about human rights, but aid agencies generally ignore them.

All of the development priorities above are as relevant to education as they are to broader development strategies. Of fundamental importance is to base education policy on the right to education. UNESCO and UNICEF have already moved in this direction, but the Bank and the Fund resist. In part, that is because such a change would wreak havoc with an instrumental human capital framework where education is only valued for its impact on earnings and economic growth, not seen as an end in itself. Also specific to education, I would add, that there is a need to bring a critical pedagogy framework to all education, one that starts where learners are, examines the history and nature of their place in the world system, and considers strategies for transformation (McLaren and Kincheloe, 2007).

More of the same research is not needed.
Most studies end with a call for further research. Doing research has been another major excuse for inaction. Unfortunately, most research offers little guidance about what to do. While all five books indicate the need for more research, a number of them, and other related works, recognize how little research has to offer. Ellerman (2005, p. 18) talks of “helpers... supplying biased information, partisan econometrics, and one-sided arguments.” Riddell (2003, p. 174) argues that, given the “complexities of development...it would seem to be over-ambitious to believe it possible to quantify precisely the relationship between aid and growth, aid and development, aid and poverty reduction.” Hoebink (2009, p. 35) points out that regression analyses in development research “are highly contested.” In a more recent work, Easterly (2008) argues:

The literature [on aid and growth] suffers from such unrestricted specifications and endless iteration among these specifications that virtually any result on aid and growth is possible and indeed all possible results have already been presented in the literature: aid effects are conditional on good policies, they are not conditional on good policies; aid has a positive effect on growth, aid has no effect on growth; aid has a linear effect on growth, aid has a quadratic effect on growth; only certain types of aid matters, all types of aid are equivalent...Growth regressions in general have been criticized on the grounds of data mining and specification searching...[The result is that]...the regression wars on foreign aid and growth show no sign of ending anytime soon. (p. 18)
The complete indeterminacy of this kind of quantitative research is not confined to the literature about aid and development. As I have argued elsewhere (Klees, 2008b), for quantitative research methods to yield reliable cause-effect information requires fulfilling impossible conditions. Regression analysis, the most frequently used methodology, requires three conditions: all independent variables that affect the dependent variable are in the equation, all variables are measured correctly, and the correct functional form is specified. In practice, these conditions are never fulfilled and can never be fulfilled. Regression analysis studies thus become a battleground over model specification which forms the basis for an endless debate over results in, for example, literatures on economic growth, student achievement, welfare policies, Head Start, class size, vouchers for schools or housing, and many others.

It is currently fashionable to call for an alternative to regression analysis – randomized experiments (Duflo and Kremer, 2008). In theory, well-controlled experiments are supposed to make it easy to make cause-effect inferences. In practice, real world experiments, outside the laboratory, are never well controlled. Therefore, randomization buys you little, and control groups always differ from experimental groups. Researchers acknowledge this and try to make compensatory statistical adjustments, but they are always ad hoc and easily contestable. Basically, real world experiments revert right back to the need for proper regression analysis specification to untangle cause-effect relationships, as evidenced in many of the same literatures mentioned above.

This is a major conundrum. We do need research and evaluation to help figure out what works, yet research and evaluation results are always contested and contestable. My only answer is to return to the centrality of participation. Participatory research and evaluation – with participation by beneficiaries and other stakeholders as well as by analysts who depart from different frameworks – may not yield clear answers, but it can put our debates on the table. Drawing on quantitative, qualitative, and critical research and evaluation methodologies (Mertens, 2004; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), the resulting information and arguments should become part of participatory decision-making processes. When truth becomes a problematic goal, the legitimacy of political processes becomes paramount.

Educational research and evaluation are as biased, indeterminate, and contested as any other. Again, I do not mean this as a call to halt all research. I do mean that most of the above recommendations do not depend on further research. I also mean that when research is needed, the principal form of research that makes sense is participatory research.

In closing, Moyo’s concluding thought about whether millions more would die if aid were to be stopped should be central to the consideration of the choices we face. The indicators that I began this paper with are horrendous. Right now millions are dying and dying needlessly; millions more are barely surviving at the margins. Relatively few resources are needed to change this. The market mechanism does not work for billions of people and aid is insufficient and misdirected. Transformation is possible. We can turn this around and make the 21st century the first one that is just and humane.

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Responses

The Ignorant Donor:
A Radical Reimagination of International Aid,
Development, and Education

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The logic behind international aid to development has typically centered on economics. Notwithstanding the variation in focus – from macroeconomic monetary and trade policies, to economic wealth programs aimed at creating jobs, to supply- and demand-side reforms – the central discourse on international aid has been dominated by a political economist’s viewpoint. Steven Klees’ article, “Aid, Development, and Education” continues to use an economic perspective by challenging some of the neoliberal economic assumptions made within the development industry since the 1970s. He offers a refreshing progressive alternative to the dominant neoliberal agenda and its institutions. His initial question – has such aid helped? – has a clear answer in all of the literature he reviews: no, aid has not been as effective as it could have been. But his call for a “new architecture” of international development derives from “old” foundations, reinforcing the established pillars of the economic development continuum – neoliberal, liberal, and progressive. Will a progressive development architecture produce a different outcome than that of (neo)liberalism without rebuilding the philosophical foundations of international aid? Is a reimagination of international aid along radically new philosophical lines possible? If so, what would it look like?

As the development industry is becoming increasingly institutionalized as a science, business, and fashion – after all, anyone (from Western academics to Starbucks customers to celebrities) can now become development “experts” – we would like to challenge the very foundation on which the contemporary development architecture rests. Turning to an 18th-century French teacher named Joseph Jacotot, who attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to reconceptualize education as an “intellectual emancipation” by implicating teacher expertise in perpetuating inequality, we ponder the possibility of a radical reimagination of international aid along similar lines. Instead of reinforcing the edifice of Western development expertise (seeking better “best practices,” identifying more efficient development methods, or mobilizing additional resources for international aid), perhaps what we really need is an “ignorant donor” – a donor who enters the development scene without the baggage of international aid politics and the concerns of economic progress; who assumes an equality of intelligence in all stakeholders; and who sees empowerment, participation, and education as the ends in the process of international (and national) aid.

On Expertise and Ignorance in International Development
At the end of the 18th century during the prehistory of mass schooling, Jacotot discovered a style of teaching based on emancipation called panecastic. In The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière (1991) recounts the story of Jacotot, who came to the realization that explication stultifies education by curtailing the independent learning students are able to accomplish on their own. Knowing no Flemish, Jacotot realized that he could successfully teach Flemish students who did not know any
French through the use of a translated book:

To prevent stultification there must be something between the master and the student. The same thing which links them must separate them. Jacotot posited the book as that in-between thing. The book is that material thing, foreign to both the master and the student, where they can verify what the student has seen, what he has told about it, what he thinks of what he has told. (Rancière, 2004, p. 7)

Purposefully unaware of teaching methods and pedagogy, an ignorant schoolmaster could “teach” anything to anybody by encouraging students to see, to tell, and to verify: “[The teacher] had only given [the students] the order to pass through a forest whose openings and clearings he himself had not discovered. Necessity had constrained him to leave his intelligence entirely out of the picture” (Rancière, 1991, p. 9). Instead of worshipping an intellectual hierarchy institutionalized in mass schooling, Jacotot proposed a method of intellectual emancipation based on the principle that all humans have equal intelligence, can instruct themselves, and everything is in everything. Universal teaching shattered the “pedagogical myth” claiming that “there is an inferior intelligence and a superior one” where the “superior intelligence knows things by reason, proceeds by method, from the simple to the complex, from the part to the whole” (Rancière, 1991, p. 7). Viewing education as the act of emancipation, Jacotot believed the equality of intelligence was the only starting point for any educational experience. The power of education was therefore not in his ability to control the distance between student and teacher’s knowledge but rather in a teacher’s ignorance of his own intelligence during the very act of teaching.

While the lessons of Jacotot received a brief flurry of attention at the end of the 18th century, they quickly fell into oblivion as education became institutionalized in the form of modern mass schooling (Ross, 1991). Mass schooling became the antithesis of Jacotot’s revolutionary ideas as today’s educational rhetoric attests with its relentless insistence on standards (for “best practice”), achievement (of minimum intelligence), and accountability (for procedural equality, among other things). Built around the 19th century myth of “progress,” educational institutions have forcefully displaced the notion of equality of intelligence while maintaining “old intellectual hierarchies” (Rancière, 1991, p. 109) through the division of the world into the knowing and the ignorant, the enlightened and the uninformed, the developed and the developing. These “partitions of the sensible” are “allegories of inequality” (Rancière, 2004, p. 6) whereby mass schooling reinscribes an endless dependency of learners on “expert” knowledge and perpetuates the gap between the knowledgeable and the unintelligent.

The presupposition of the inequality of intelligence has penetrated not only modern mass schooling but also international development efforts. Notwithstanding the different approaches (whether neoliberal, liberal, or progressive), the development industry continues to place people, organizations, and countries with power at a (perceived) higher intellectual position than those on the receiving end. More importantly, the mechanisms of power institutionalizing the inequality of intelligence in international development are becoming increasingly refined, polished, and normalized. As Escobar (1998) explains, “the forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression as by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action” (p. 92). In this context, equality will never be possible: “Never will the student catch up with the master, nor the people with its enlightened elite; but the hope of getting there makes them advance along the good road…” (Rancière, 1991, p. 120). In the context of international development, never will the “developing” nations catch up with the “developed,” the Rest with the West. It is this
foundational assumption of today’s international development framework – the presupposition of the inequality of intelligence – that needs to be dismantled before making any attempt at building “a new architecture” of international development and aid.

**New Architecture, Old Foundation**

The development continuum outlined by Klees provides useful insights into the differences and similarities between the dominant paradigms of international aid. On one end of the continuum, development experts see market solutions as more effective than government interventions, as in Dichter, Easterly, and Moyo’s neoliberal reconceptualizations of aid. In the middle are liberal (with progressive tendencies) experts like Ellerman, Riddell, and Sachs who call for increasing the scope and improving the effectiveness of aid delivery to those in need; who recognize the complexity and lopsidedness of donor-donee relationships; and who advocate for a human rights approach to aid. On the other end of the continuum, Klees proposes a broadly defined approach focused primarily on “equity before growth” – the 1970s idea proposing a global redistribution of wealth towards the needs of the disadvantaged. Equity before growth, combined with an increase in total Official Development Assistance (comparable in size to the Marshall plan) and the elimination of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are Klees’ broad outlines for a new paradigm. Based on a “participatory process” of agreed upon priorities (e.g., impact the poor, emphasize gender, go to scale, and consider the environment), Klees’ progressive paradigm of international development would not require more research but more action to “make the 21st century the first one that is just and humane.”

Klees’ argument for a progressive paradigm of development assistance appears to reflect radical ideas. After all, the very notion of redistributing wealth would make most conservatives in the US cringe. Citing Joel Samoff (2009), Klees (2010) agrees that the aid system “is in fact working very well. Its essential role is not to achieve publicly stated objectives but rather to maintain a global political economy of inequality” (p. 16). Inequality is a result of neoliberal ideas – not progressive ideas – the logic goes. But how would inequality not be present in a progressive paradigm? Klees does not – and probably cannot – provide an answer, but rather points out the liberal-progressive’s emphasis on a human rights framework and the need for a critical pedagogy perspective in education reform. While the contributions of critical pedagogy are undeniable (most importantly, it enriched education policy and practice by introducing such powerful concepts as ideology, hidden curriculum, and official knowledge), it has not solved the problem of inequality. Similar to conservative efforts of education reform, critical pedagogy continues to see inequality as “a taken-for-granted, even obvious state of affairs to be confronted by the right mixtures of policies and praxis” (Friedrich, Jaastad & Popkewitz, 2010, p. 573).5 Ironically, it is this belief in the human ability to manage inequality that creates such stark similarities between the neoliberal, liberal, and progressive paradigms.

What remains unchallenged (and what closely connects the neoliberal, liberal, and progressive paradigms) is the foundational belief in “progress,” an unrelenting assumption that international development is linear, based on rationality, and progressing towards a “better” world for all. Klees himself confirms these similarities: “these paradigms are more continuous and overlapping than mutually exclusive” (p. 10). Indeed, neoliberals, liberals, and progressives may disagree on what is the “right” way or method towards a better future, but all agree about the overall vision. For example, some argue for a radical reduction or complete elimination of international aid (see Dichter, Easterly, Moyo), while others insist on a radical expansion of aid (see Klees, Riddell). Some may prescribe supply-side reforms (more schools, teachers, and materials), while others focus on the demand-side reforms (more conditional cash transfers, vouchers, and stipends). Yet, they all
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speak from the shared conceptual foundation of Western modernity. With academic degrees in economics or development studies, these are world-renowned experts who have studied and worked in the development industry. They therefore “know” the remedies – almost a perverse form of human alchemy – necessary for societies to progress towards the archetypal Developed World. They can even measure (although may disagree over methodology) where countries are on this linear path too.

To disrupt the linearity of modernity’s development paradigms and to demystify their “charismatic power of attraction” (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, p. 1), it is important to carefully examine some of the shared assumptions made by international “experts” across the development continuum described by Klees. For the purpose of this short response, we will focus on two assumptions that seem to most forcefully entrench inequality in contemporary development discourse and practice. These are (1) the logic of rescue that guides most development efforts and (2) the focus on education, empowerment, and participation as the means (not the ends) of international development initiatives aimed at achieving equality. Combined, these underlying assumptions not only maintain the gap between those in power and those in need, but also postpone equality indefinitely.

The logic of rescue
The logic of rescue is perhaps the most striking manifestation of the gap between the knowledgeable and the unintelligent, the presupposition made by Jacotot’s “stultifying master”: “the master presupposes that what the student learns is that same thing as what he teaches him” (Rancière, 2004, p. 7). The teacher holds knowledge students have yet to learn, and only at the correct time will the stultifying master explicate this knowledge to the unintelligent. This knowledge is transmitted homogeneously, without variation. But as students progress by learning the master’s knowledge, it becomes apparent that the student will never know everything the master does. The master controls knowledge and has the power to distribute it at will. International aid acts in a similar fashion. The gap between those who are “helping” and those who are “helped” is no different than the stultifying master and his students: helpers (development experts, development agencies, developed countries, and ordinary citizens) presuppose that (1) help is actually needed; (2) their approach is correct for the situation; (3) the people receiving help cannot help themselves; and (4) their help (if followed directly) will result in a better outcome. Inherent within this logic of rescue are clear spatial demarcations and distances between “good” knowledge, “bad” knowledge, and “no” knowledge. Helpers control the “good” knowledge and see it as their responsibility to pass it on to the perceived unintelligent.

Although the division between those giving and receiving help is clear, development agencies nevertheless speak of their efforts as working towards equality. The logic of rescue is thus employed to close the gap between the knowledgeable and the unintelligent in hopes of achieving universal equality. Yet, the very suppression of this gap creates a false sense of equality (Rancière’s notion of “the good road”), and only perpetuates the foundational assumption of inequality of intelligence. Klees’ notion of “compensatory legitimation” by “good cops” who come up with solutions to inequality and “bad cops” who question the legitimacy of the world order is another way of making the same point. Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), for example, are ways of including everyone in the utopia of equality. It is thought that the distance between the knowledgeable and the unintelligent is suppressed within this paradigm. By using notions similar to Popkewitz’s (2008) abjection, it becomes clear that speaking of inclusion by referencing only those who are excluded reinforces the inequality that the various international (and national) campaigns for equality try to remedy. In other words, the very attempt to suppress
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the distance between the knowledgeable and the unintelligent in the name of equality perpetuates inequality.

With the logic of rescue penetrating all layers of society (including development agencies, governments, and now ordinary citizens), the notion of “help” has become increasingly individualized. Everyone is expected to “help” in one way or another – we must buy product (RED)™, we must donate to Haiti via cell phone, we must make the world “a better place.” From altruistic help to obligated help to chic help – helping has taken on multiple forms, becoming attractive to an increasingly large audience of potential helpers. In a way, such massification of “help” has opened new opportunities for anyone (irrespective of geographic location, socioeconomic background, or political orientation) to become involved in the act of “helping,” thus strengthening the gap between the “helpers” and those in need through a collective action of rescue. As (RED)™ proclaims, “Buy (RED)™, save lives. It is as simple as that.” In other words, anyone can now “help” save a person’s life while shopping at GAP or buying a Starbucks coffee. We are also assured that small acts of “help” are valued. We are not expected to save the whole world (at least not right away); we can begin by saving “one child at a time,” “one school at a time,” or “one village at a time” – all by buying one coffee at a time. By spinning the act of help as manageable and international aid as “young, chic, and possible” (Richey & Ponte, 2008, p. 711), such an unprecedented massification of “help” further cements the concept of inequality – the very gap between those who know and those who do not – as the foundational assumption of the existing development policies and practices.

The means/ends of development

The contemporary development paradigm sees education, participation, and empowerment as means to an end, be it the elimination of poverty, the growth of an economy, or the attainment of peace. From this perspective, education becomes a tool that, if used correctly, should lead to some desired (and predetermined) outcome – education for peace (see UNICEF, 1999), education for democracy (see the US Congress, 2001), education to end poverty (see MDG goal 2), or education to fight terrorism (see Mortenson & Relin, 2008). This conceptualization is problematic for two reasons. First, it reduces the role of education to a very technical process, which can be easily controlled and managed for “better” outcomes. It assumes that equality could be achieved given the right combination of education policies and practices. As Rancière (1999) warns, however, this logic can only lead to one outcome: “the integral pedagogization of society – the general infantilization of the individuals that make it up” (p. 133). By extension, the failure to achieve equality is blamed on the very act (and system) of education itself. Education therefore becomes a scapegoat when the ultimate end – achieving equality – is not met.

Second, and more importantly, the development paradigm views equality as a goal, an end to “development.” Within this conceptualization it becomes clear that the foundational assumption of the contemporary development paradigm does not center on equality at all. Equality, rather, is something we all must work towards, must achieve through the right combination of policies and practices. With a philosophical starting point of inequality (which is shared by neoliberal, liberal, and progressive development paradigms alike), it is not surprising that inequality continues to persist. In other words, setting equality as a goal denies people the ability to assume an equality of intelligence and practice equality on a daily basis. Ultimately, what is done in the name of equality results in the reproduction of social dependencies and intellectual hierarchies (Biesta,

Equality is not a goal that governments and societies could succeed in reaching. To pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the pedagogues of progress, who widen endlessly the distance they promise that they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom – or it is nothing. (p. 223)

By narrowly viewing education as a means to achieve other goals, we thus fail to perceive it as a value by itself. But what if “participation,” “education,” and “empowerment” became the ends of the development process? And what if equality were viewed as the starting point (not the finish line) of any educational reform? What an individual will do with education and freedom is completely up to her. With these ends, a new starting point emerges similar to Jocotot’s: the belief in the equality of intelligence in all people. Yet nowhere in the contemporary development policy circles is the notion of equality of intelligence recognized, supported, or recommended, let alone funded. What matters, therefore, “is not that we are committed to equality, democracy, and emancipation, but how we are committed to these concepts and how we express and articulate this commitment” (Biesta, 2010, p. 57). Equality, in other words, is practiced – not achieved.

Conclusion
The three dominant development paradigms (neoliberal, liberal, and progressive) outlined by Klees support the foundational assumption of one group of people knowing more than another. This assumption of inequality is no different than what Jacotot saw burgeoning in mass schooling in the 18th century: the very attempts for equality in education were – and continue to be – rooted in profound ideologies of inequality. Instead of building “a new architecture” on the old foundation of Western modernity, perhaps it is time to search for new philosophical starting points to help us think about international development, aid, and education. It is not our job in this conclusion to create a new foundation, but rather to begin pondering the possibility of placing an equality of intelligence as the central assumption within international development. By escaping the logic of rescue and flipping the means and the ends of development, we can begin to imagine new ways of conceptualizing aid.

A paradigm based on the concept of equality of intelligence allows us to reimagine the very notion of equality. As Jacotot realized in his 18th-century classroom, “equality is not given, nor is it claimed; it is practiced, it is verified” (Rancière, 1991, p. 137). The three dominant development paradigms see international development practitioners (governments, NGOs, international organizations, and, increasingly, ordinary citizens) giving equality – the very epitome of inequality because of the power relations inherent in the idea of “giving.” The notion of “handing out education” to “one child at a time” becomes anachronism in this new paradigm. To work towards equality, the stultifying donors of the present will have to learn to be ignorant.

The ignorant donor will ignore the gap between the presupposed intelligence of the poor and that of the rich and let the poor and vulnerable “pass through a forest whose openings and clearings he himself had not discovered,” for the ignorant donor is not poor or vulnerable. The method of passing through this forest and what is actually learned in the process of passing will not be of concern to the ignorant donor either. Why fear that development may become a “chaotic, strictly locally determined phenomenon” (Klees, 2010, p. 21)? Why not respect the decisions made locally and reposition responsibility for re-envisioning one’s future? What if the end is simply creating the circumstances for a “child in need” to pass, no matter what happens afterwards? Assuming an equality of intelligence as a starting point of international development would thus require
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the donor of yore to relinquish control of the development industry’s stultifying logic and instead practice equality, embracing the unpredictable, uncertain, and diverse outcomes inevitable in the process.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Hugh McLean for introducing us to the Ignorant Schoolmaster. Our conversations about the implications of trading short-term success for long-term inequality have helped us see and articulate new philosophical possibilities in development, aid, and education.

Endnotes
1. Both authors organized the CIES Northeast Regional Conference held at Lehigh University in October 2009 where Steven Klees first delivered the paper under examination in this special issue of CICE.
2. We will limit our response to Klees’ timeline, development aid since the late 1970s, or more broadly defined as the Ronald Reagan-Margaret Thatcher era; however, the points made within this paper can extend to the earlier period of post-World War II reconstruction.
3. Panecastic stems from the French word panécastique, meaning “everything in each.”
4. Panecasticism, or universal teaching, moved towards the empowerment of people through their ability to take knowledge and practice equality – not receive them by philosopher-kings who explicated in front of classrooms. The central question for universal teaching was “what do you think about it?” Students therefore were given the opportunity to see, compare, reflect, imitate, try, and correct – by themselves.
5. For a more elaborate critique of the relationship between equality/inequality and critical pedagogy, see Friedrich, Jaastad & Popkewitz (2010) and Biesta (2010).

References


Improving Aid Effectiveness or Transforming the Global Capitalist System

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In the introduction to his article, “Aid, Development, and Education,” Klees (2010) poses the question, has the “hundreds of billions of dollars in international aid … loaned to [or otherwise targeted to “assist”] developing countries through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms … helped?” (p. 6). He then posits the question to be “too complicated to be well specified” for empirical study, in part because “there are a myriad of interactive factors that affect poverty and economic growth besides aid” and “international aid serves many [other] purposes.” After reviewing a set of recent books on aid (Dichter, 2003; Easterly, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Riddell, 2007) framed mainly by authors subscribing to a neoliberal capitalist perspective, Klees concludes by stating that “the best anyone can say is that the situation could have been a lot worse than it is now without aid.” Ironically, though, this conclusion may apply to: a) the quality of life for all human beings and/or b) the compensatory legitimation (Weiler, 1988) of the world economic system and national political economies.

I basically agree with Klees’ analysis of the issues and his critical review of these assessments of aid. However, I would take the critique further and promote a more radical – and, in my view, more humane – agenda for change. To begin with, I would problematize “development” much more than Klees does. Although the question he posed (above) is framed around the term “aid,” he appropriately includes the term “development” in the title of his article, given that most of the focus is on overseas or foreign development assistance. Klees does reference Frank’s (1967) critical analysis of the global economic system, but refrains from naming the system (Yates, 2003),¹ let alone calling for a transformation of global capitalist relations (e.g., Skocpol, 1977; Wallerstein, 1984). Instead, his argument could be (mis)interpreted as claiming that “poverty and inequality” result from – and are being reproduced by – neoliberalism.² I share Klees’ critique of neoliberalism, but would emphasize that it is only one of several ideologies (and associated policies and actions) which, historically, have been marshaled (with some success) to mobilize support for and demobilize opposition to the world capitalist system.³ Thus, in my opinion, we need to be very careful in using the term “development,” given that its meaning has been captured within a capitalist framework. One might want to try to rescue the term by referencing social democratic, socialist, eco-feminist, or sustainable, human rights-based development, but perhaps it is better to focus our attention and energies on transforming the unjust “capitalist” world system.⁴

In brief, capitalism refers to a mode of productive and attendant social relations in which the means of production are privately owned and the profits derived from the sale of the goods and services produced are privately accumulated. From a Marxist perspective, a fundamental contradiction of capitalism is that “although production is [increasingly] a social activity, the ownership and control of the means of production are privately concentrated” (Ginsburg, 1988, p. 8; see also Mao Tse-Tung, 1971). Because the logic of capitalism is capital accumulation (i.e., growth and concentration of capital via increasing profits or surplus value), there are systemic pressures against the needs of the majority of people being met. This results from “the restrictions
capitalism imposes on the individual and social consumption of the workers ... because the aim of capitalist production is to maximise surplus value, and this necessitates limiting the growth of real wages” (Democratic Socialist Perspective, 2006).

According to Marx (1875/1972, p. 388), there would be a quite different logic underpinning socialist or communist productive/social relations: “From each according to [one’s] ability, to each according to [one’s] needs.” This logic or ethical stance, of course, is not limited to Marxism. For example, within the “Acts of the Apostles” in the New Testament, it is written that the apostles “sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, according as anyone had need” (Acts 2:45). More recently, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that every person – “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or ... the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs” (Article 2) – has the rights to: a) “employment [with] ... just and favorable conditions of work ... [and] remuneration” as well as b) “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of [one]self and of [one’s] family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services” (Article 25).

To illustrate, one can conceive of capitalism as structured similarly to the goals and rules of the Milton Bradley board game “Monopoly.” The goal for individual players is to accumulate as much property and other assets as possible. One wins the game when other players have no assets or give up because their chances of acquiring assets seem too limited. There are no rules that require sharing resources or the benefits of such, though rules do not proscribe players from making loans or even outright cash transfers or grants to each other, sometimes done as an act of human kindness or merely to prolong the game. In a sense, the game can be summarized as “from each according to one’s ability (or luck), to each according to one’s greed.”

How would the game, which I will call “Utopia,” be structured if it were based on the logic or ethic referenced above: “from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s needs?” To start with, the goal of this game would not be to accumulate property and other assets (i.e., capital), but to identify and mobilize all players’ abilities to participate collectively in determining the needs of various people (e.g., based on a human rights framework), to develop the “needed” kinds of goods/services and policies, and to engage in practices that guarantee an equitable and appropriate distribution of goods/services and realization of rights. Notice that in the game of “Utopia,” meeting other players’ needs and insuring their rights would not be left to an afterthought, an act of kindness, or a desire to prolong the game. Instead, such actions constitute the core – the goals and rules – of the game.

Imagine how this game might be translated into the real world of human action. Pursuing the “Utopian” game of life would entail working collaboratively, but likely also struggling to focus local, national, and global political, economic, and cultural systems to determine and to meet human needs. In this reality some of what is termed “development assistance” or “aid” – helping people to meet their needs and realize their rights – would become core activities of the system rather than voluntary, supplementary, or compensatory actions when wealthy individuals, groups, or nations were so inclined or thought such actions were in their best interest. That is, to reference a term Freire (1970) used in discussing the paternalism of social welfare programs, we would do away with “false generosity.”

Another implication of this Utopian version of human experience is that attention would be focused on the private sector, not as a model but as a site for analysis and struggle – to focus
local, national, and multinational corporate activity so that it would help to meet human needs and realize human rights. One of my concerns about the debates regarding aid effectiveness, including the contribution by Klees, is that corporations are not included in the picture. Klees and others note that a sizeable proportion of the relatively limited proportion of wealthy countries’ GDP devoted to aid ends up purchasing goods and services from for-profit and non-profit entities in these countries. However, one also needs to examine how the everyday actions of multinational corporations, for example, reinforce or contradict the stated “development” goals of bilateral and multilateral international donor organizations. This would offer a more complex and accurate picture of the workings of the world system than is provided by a focus on government actions only. Attention to multinational corporate activity may be especially important, in that at least in the mid-1990s it was estimated that “more than a quarter of the world’s economic activity … stems from only two hundred corporations, while approximately one-third of world trade takes place among different units of a single global company” (Braun, 1997, p. 143).

Some readers may think proposals for ‘socializing’ the responsibility and benefit of economic activity are too radical to be considered in the current situation. If so, this would indicate that neoliberal and other pro-capitalist ideologies are functioning well, foreclosing alternative discourses, let alone actions. Such readers, however, might be interested to learn about two recommendations made by one of the neoliberal economists whose book Klees discussed. In her provocatively titled volume, Dead Aid, Moyo (2009) calls for ending bilateral and multilateral aid programs and basically subjecting those living in poor countries to the “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776/1976) of the market. For instance, she states that “it should come as no surprise that the … prescriptions are market-based, since no economic ideology other than one rooted in the movement of capital and competition has succeeded in getting the greater number of people out of poverty, in the fastest time” (Moyo, 2009, p. 145; emphasis added). Whether one agrees or not with her conclusion, however, it is interesting that she also recommends what I would term socializing the risks, responsibilities, and benefits of a) individuals taking out loans for micro-enterprises and b) nations taking out loans to move on their ‘development’ agendas.

Let me now turn to the recommendations that Klees makes in his article in this issue of CICE – both in relation to aid and development in general and with reference to education more specifically:

- **Much more money is needed.** I agree, but efforts should be made to transform the global political economic system so that human needs and human rights are the main focus, rather than some proportionate compensatory measure. Moreover, this applies both to funds that now flow through bilateral and multilateral development assistance channels and to how economic enterprises operate.

- **Disburse some of that money directly to the poor.** I agree, although it is important to change the nature of the “game.” As those of us who have played in marathon sessions of “Monopoly” games know, even if all players start out with the same resources at the beginning of each game, the goals and rules of the game lead to a conclusion: a “winner” (with most or all of the property and other assets) and “losers” (with zero or limited property and other assets). I suspect that, although it would be an interesting experiment to annually (re)distribute resources equally to all people in the world, under the current “rules of the game,” by the end of each year everyone’s needs would not be met and everyone’s rights would not be realized.

- **Real and strong participation should be the fundamental basis for governance.** I agree, but would add that such governance should focus on the economy as well as the polity. As noted, I view
collective decision making as critical in relation to determining and meeting needs.

- **Replace the World Bank and the IMF.** Perhaps it would be too naïve to consider trying to transform these two Bretton Woods institutions as well as the World Trade organization, which has the potential (because of the General Agreement on Trade of Services) to impact many aspects of human activity, including culture and education (Ginsburg et al., 2005). Would it be possible to envision, let alone accomplish, a transformation of global institutions, which were not only more democratic in their functioning but also profoundly focused on meeting human needs and realizing human rights?

- **There are development priorities that might be agreed upon.** Although I am not proposing we approach the social problems that face humanity in a compensatory “aid” framework, I agree with Klees that we need to focus government, NGO, and private sector activity so that it has a (positive) impact on the poor. Likely, some educational and other assistance may be needed so that the currently more advantaged populations actively and effectively engage in actions that support (and do not contradict) the goals of meeting human needs and realizing human rights.\(^9\) I would argue similarly for emphasizing gender, giving attention to the needs and rights of girls as well as boys, while helping both genders develop capacities and commitments for meeting all people’s needs. Of course, I agree with Klees that we need to “go to scale,” but on global as well as national levels and in relation to actions of governments and economic enterprises. I also agree with Klees regarding the importance (not adequately articulated above) of considering issues regarding the environment as well as peace and conflict, both of which relate directly to human needs.

- **Use human rights as a framework.** As sketched above, I view a human rights framework as an important starting point (see also Ginsburg et al., 2010). This includes Article 26 of the UN Declaration (United Nations, 1948), which grants to “all peoples and all nations” the right to free and compulsory “education…at least in the elementary…stage” as well as the availability and merit-based access to “technical and professional education…and higher education.”\(^10\) Here I should note that although I understand the arguments that under existing arrangements higher education may have more private/individual than public benefits, I would argue that funding for higher education, which prepares individuals to function in a system focused on meeting human needs and realizing human rights (rather than on an individual student’s future status and remuneration), raises a different set of issues.\(^11\)

- **More research is not needed.** I share Klees’ view that “doing research” should not be “another excuse for inaction,” but I believe more action research and decision-oriented research will be needed. Such inquiry would not be done by “external” agents to identify the problem, but undertaken by local, national, and global actors as they seek to identify needs and evaluate (in a formative sense) efforts to meet the needs and realize the rights of all people.

It may take a few years, I say optimistically, to change the game (including its goals and rules) from “Monopoly” capitalism to a socialist, religious, or ethical “Utopia.” I wish I could be as sanguine as Klees seems to be that the 2008 global financial crisis has wiped away the ideological and repressive apparatuses (see Althusser, 1971) that have tended to limit thoughts and actions aimed at fundamentally changing the global economic system. While clearly a significant development, this most recent crisis is but one in a long history of crises. Moreover, the thoughts and actions of millions of people who were suffering economically and otherwise before 2008 are testimony to the fact that it may take more than experiencing a problem to be willing and able to identify and
work to fix its source. As Yates (2003) comments:

The … view that workers’ consciousness will [necessarily] become more radical as a result of economic crises provides a very mechanistic view of people’s thoughts and actions. Unemployment is as likely to make people drink heavily or hate themselves as it is to make them revolutionaries. A crisis might make people susceptible to right-wing propaganda, more willing to bash immigrant workers than to organize with them. It is wise to remember that the 1930s gave us fascism as well as radical communism. (p. 193)

Indeed, recent developments provide support for Yates’ analysis, while at the same time emphasizing that the contradictions of capitalism – and the crises that arise because of them – potentially provide the space for recognizing the source of the problem (capitalism) and joining with others to construct a different global political economy (Ginsburg, 1988). However, this does not happen easily or automatically. The point is not to sit around waiting for radical change to happen, but to engage in social movements as well as struggles in everyday work and life (Ginsburg and Cooper, 1991). Thus, while some efforts should be directed in the short term to improve the effectiveness of “development aid,” even such actions should be animated by concerns toward – and a focus on – transforming the global capitalist system.

Endnotes
1. As Yates (2003, p. 33) observes, “our economic system is seldom called by its proper name. We hear of the market economy or the free enterprise system, neither of which tells us what we need to know.”
2. I draw this conclusion based on the way Klees frames his overall argument and because he identifies “neoliberal policies” as the focus of the “challenge[s] by individuals, organizations, social movements, and left-of-center governments.” In terms of such challenges, one might instead frame such efforts as challenging global capitalist relations (e.g., see Brecher et al., 2000; Danaher and Burbach, 2000).
3. For similar reasons, I reinterpret Hanf et al.’s (1975, p. 68) conclusion that “formal education in Africa and Asia in its present form tends to impede economic growth and promote political instability; in short, education in Africa and Asia today is an obstacle to development.” Certainly, there were – and still are – problems with education in Africa and Asia and other regions of the world, but we need to understand these problems at least in part as resulting from the fact that the education systems have been constructed within – and with at least some attention to serving the ‘needs’ of – the global capitalist system.
4. Here I should note, with caveats, my agreement with Wallerstein (1984, p. 35) that “there are today no socialist systems in the world-economy any more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world system. It is a world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form.” This is not to suggest that national and subnational initiatives were – and are – being undertaken to carve out some counter-hegemonic space, and that some of these efforts are informed by Marxist or socialist ideas/practices.
5. In the same writing, Marx (1875/1972) indicates that under socialism the dictum would likely be different, from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s “contribution.”
6. Note that we may need to reconsider some of the economic rights enshrined in this Declaration, given that they reflect a commitment to, or at least a compromise with, capitalism. For example, Article 17 stipulates the right to “own property alone as well as in association with others.”
7. A different conception of capitalism is provided by another board game, “Class Struggle.” “The object of the game is to win the revolution … Until then, classes – represented by different players – advance around the board, making and breaking alliances, and picking up strengths and weaknesses that determine the outcome of the elections and general strikes which occur along the way” (Ollman, 1978, p. 1).

8. The radical economist Yates (2003, p. 161; emphasis added) explains that neoclassical economists “claim to show that an economy [i.e., capitalism] based on self-interest will be one that satisfies society’s most pressing needs and does so better than other systems … [and] studies have shown that students who take a course in economics [normally monopolized by neoclassical economists’ ideas] are more likely to behave selfishly than those who have not.”

9. In this sense, at least during a transition away from the existing system, Freire’s (1970) ideas for a “pedagogy of the oppressed” would likely need to be complemented by Curry-Stevens’ (2004) proposals for a “pedagogy for the privileged.”

10. In addition to education, and the economic rights referenced earlier, attention should be given to political/civil rights (e.g., not to being “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” [Article 5]; “equal protection of the law” [Article 7]; “a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal” [Article 10]; “take part in the government of [one’s] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” [Article 23]) and social/cultural rights (e.g., “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” [Article 18]; “freedom of opinion and expression … and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” [Article 19]; “freely participate in the cultural life of the community, … enjoy the arts, and … share in scientific advancement and its benefits” [Article 27]).

11. However, unless – and until – resources are (re)distributed on an annual basis to all people, I believe that subsidies for attending higher education programs should be based on financial need, with the poorest benefiting from free or even compensated enrollment.

References


Improving Aid Effectiveness or Transforming the Global Capitalist System


Towards the end of the twentieth century a sickness struck the world. Not everyone died, but all suffered from it. The virus which caused the epidemic was called the ‘liberal virus.’ (Amin, 2003, p. 6)

In Klees’ review of recent works that assess whether development has been well served, or served at all, by international aid, the assessment is overwhelmingly pessimistic and in favor of the market as the antidote to international aid. Three of the books that Klees reviews – Easterly (2006), Moyo (2009), and Dichter (2009) – conclude that the market is a more potent mechanism for alleviating poverty and ensuring development than are aid institutions. These writings reflect the normalization of the neoliberal logic that endorses a market solution to all socio-economic issues and argues for private capital to stimulate economic development in the Third World. The underlying assumption is that economic growth and private enterprise will have spillover effects on social life and assure improvements in health and education indices, a sort of lateral version of the “trickle down” of modernization theory. While this assumption is not new and represents classic liberal thinking, the neoliberal logic inserts an additional twist and endorses private entrepreneurship and quasi-market behavior in social sectors of education and health to substitute for state and international aid investments.

As Klees states at the outset, to find this view expressed by development experts is hardly surprising. To extend Klees’ argument about the ascendancy of the neoliberal perspective over the last three decades, I would append three moments that have been instrumental in mobilizing neoliberalism as the new “common sense”: i) the fall of communist states and the “end of history” that anointed western “free market” ideology as the heir apparent of a new post-cold war geopolitics; ii) the capitulation of Third World and post-socialist states to neoliberal policy regimes; and iii) the success of the “neocon” propaganda campaign that equates markets with democracy. Klees provides a faithful review of the perspectives of the five authors and rightly situates their work as representing one of two main theoretical/political frameworks: the neoliberal and the liberal. He also identifies a third political framework, the progressive, with which he is aligned and that he finds rather scarce in the scholarship on international aid. In his essay, Klees does not adequately compensate for this lacuna; as a result we have a more extensive portrayal of the neoliberal and liberal frameworks that constitute the mainstream and are therefore more widely available to students of international aid and development. As in the scholarship, in Klees’ essay the progressive perspective is referenced in very limited ways and is effectively marginalized. In doing so the essay follows other works on this topic in misleading readers to conclude that the progressive perspective is virtually a thing of the past, or exists as a residual fringe element among development scholars.¹

My interest in this essay is to extricate the progressive perspective (as defined by Klees) from its premature burial and elaborate on progressive analysis on the future of aid and development. I do this by first parsing the very category of “progressive” and contend that its typical usage within U.S. political discourse obfuscates rather than clarifies political analysis. I build on this
point to argue that the ways in which the “progressive” perspective is circumscribed in Klees’ essay and within general U.S. political debate rules out left radical critiques of international aid and the alternatives proposed from within this framework. Finally, I outline some recent policy actions and people’s struggles in different parts of the Third World that illustrate a left radical perspective on aid and development quite distinct from the liberal progressive critiques that we have on the table thus far.

It should be abundantly clear by now that my response is not as an opponent of Steve Klees, a scholar whose work instructs and inspires my own, and a colleague whom I deeply respect, admire and value. In fact there is very little I disagree with in terms of the content of his essay. My concern is with what he excludes and elides that unfortunately is not specific to his essay but refers to a more general condition of political debate in this country. My participation in this debate is as an ally, that is, as a colleague who shares membership in the same progressive camp that Klees identifies with in his essay. Thus my critique is not directed at the neoliberal camp, something that Klees, Samoff, Stromquist, Arnove, and many others in and outside our field have done admirably. Rather, I wish to engage my fellow “progressives” who eschew the market as a solution to the unrelenting poverty, impoverishment, and marginalization of people in the Third World and who seek more humane and efficacious solutions to these pressing development issues.

Restating the Terms of the Debate
The mainstay of my critique is the manner in which the categories of conservative, liberal, and progressive are deployed as distinct and oppositional positions on aid and development, when in actuality these positions may share a lot in common and even converge in their responses to specific situations of international development assistance. The case of U.S. intervention and aid in Afghanistan presents us with a classic instance of the convergence among these three positions. Along with neoconservatives, one finds self-identified liberals, progressives, and leftists supporting the war and aid effort in Afghanistan in defense of women’s rights and democracy. Left theologian McCarracher (2010) puts it succinctly when explaining why President Obama was widely perceived as progressive and even, on occasion, a leftist by the U.S. electorate and intelligentsia:

Liberalism – or progressivism, an utterly empty word that mashes together a lot of very different tendencies on the Left – is now more than ever the left wing of capitalism, the same benediction of capitalist property relations but with a renovated racial and sexual politics. (McCarraher, 2010, italics in the original)

Early in his essay Klees (2010) remarks that “these paradigms are more continuous and overlapping than mutually exclusive” (p. 15), a feature that is not predetermined or natural but needs to be historicized. The term progressive performs precisely the work of allowing a wide umbrella, under which distinct strands of the ideological spectrum can gather and claim allegiance to notions of justice, equality, and democracy while remaining vague about what exactly each of these mean and for whom. An ironic politics unfolds where the term progressive means “something roughly leftist, roughly liberal, and roughly radical, all at the same time” (Shah, 2009). Shah (2009) explains the use of progressive in this particular way as “uniquely American” and not common to other parts of the world.²

The term “progressive” makes it impossible to distinguish between liberal and left, and this
confusion is evident in Klees’ essay when he concludes that “Riddell and Ellerman proceed from a predominantly liberal perspective, although both have some progressive elements” (p. 16). This elision has several troubling implications: first, it perpetuates the illusion that conservatism is the opposite of liberalism; and second, it forces a false rapport between liberalism and Left politics. In her masterful critique of liberalism, Brown (2002) clarifies that “liberalism is not a political position opposite to conservatism but a political order that replaces Tudor monarchy rooted in explicit class privilege with modern democratic constitutionalism rooted in abstract individualism” (p. 5). Further, liberalism is contrary to Left politics in that the former has a potentially problematic relation to the question of distribution because of “the effects of the depoliticized status of political economy in liberal orders” (Brown, 2002, p. 7). The Marxian emphasis on the distribution of power and resources should be understood as distinct from liberalism’s emphasis on social equality and the equal distribution of individuals’ rights. It is the emphasis on the individual in liberalism that I highlight here as being distinct from the Marxian emphasis on classes, along with the depoliticization of political economy – two distinctions that vanish when liberalism subsumes the Left under the label of progressivism.

Both Riddell’s Does Foreign Aid Work? and Ellerman’s Helping People Help Themselves are good examples of what separates liberal analysis from left radical analysis. For reasons of space, I will discuss Ellerman to illustrate my case. Ellerman’s use of the categories of “helpers” and “doers” invites us to imagine a fictional world of “do-gooders” (helpers in his language) and enterprising poor individuals (doers) that the invisible hand of democracy will bring together. Here development is envisioned almost as a marketplace that brings together helpers and doers in some kind of natural confluence. Through the use of apolitical categories such as “helpers” and “doers,” Ellerman presents us with a liberal populist fantasy where structures, classes, institutions, and historical power relations melt away. In other words, Ellerman’s formulation depicts the depoliticized political economy that is foundational to liberal political thought (see Brown, 2002). Moreover, Ellerman’s liberal conception is not very different from Easterly’s more explicit neoliberal recommendation that “[A]gents of assistance have to have incentives to search for what works to help the poor” (Easterly, 2006, p. 382). This is another instance of democracy construed as a market where agents (or “helpers”) can be incentivized to work for the benefit of the poor. Both authors seek to transcend the realities of international political economy by calling for direct relations between “developers” and the “poor” mediated by market rules of demand and supply or individual good will.

Change within the liberal perspective turns out to be what Eagleton (2003) calls “the present plus more options” (p. 7). Riddell and Ellerman’s recommendations fall within this ambit in their calls for greater “involvement and participation of recipients in decisions,” “transparent criteria,” “alternative distribution mechanisms,” “improvements in coordination,” “codes of conduct,” and “incrementalism and self-help,” even as they warn us that many of the present policy reforms echo exactly these objectives but accomplish very little by way of real change. Direct cash transfers advocated as a progressive measure may provide some succor to poor households, but these too, I argue, are not directed towards nurturing a left radical politics and are part of a liberal framework of distributing largesse to individual households. Direct cash transfers construe the poor primarily as consumers in a market economy whose poverty may be eased by allowing for slightly better access to the market. In so far as development and well-being are tied to an individual’s participation in the market, integrating poor people into the dominant neoliberal capitalist economy is a predetermined outcome of such schemes. In other words, the terms of the (neo)liberal economy are not contested; rather, the demand is for a share of its provisions. Direct cash transfers finding favor among progressives is indicative of liberalism constituting the outer
limits of progressive politics in this country, a distinction once again clarified by Brown (2003):

Indeed, much of the progressive political agenda in recent years has been concerned not with democratizing power but with distributing goods, and especially with pressuring the state to buttress the rights and increase the entitlements of the socially vulnerable or disadvantaged: people of color, homosexuals, women, endangered animal species, threatened wetlands, ancient forests, the sick, and the homeless. (as cited in Shah, 2009)

My argument thus far has been to show how the term “progressive” concedes ground to liberal and neoliberal perspectives and renders the radical left perspective unintelligible and ambiguous, and perhaps even out-dated and irrelevant. Assimilating the left within the progressive exempts us from engaging with the left position as a distinct, substantial, and promising way forward on issues of aid and development. By way of conclusion, I briefly outline the perspectives and analysis on aid and development from a radical left perspective that are part of the contemporary political scenario.

Toward a Left Radical Critique of International Aid

There are several references scattered through Klees’ essay that speak of a left radical position on aid. In particular, he agrees with Samoff (2009) that the aid system’s “essential role is not to achieve publicly stated objectives but rather to maintain a global political economy of inequality” (quoted in Klees, 2010, p. 16). To counteract the structural inequities secured by international aid, Klees calls for a transformative politics that is rooted in “widespread collective action” (p. 16). I could not agree more, though I believe his recommendations I believe remain faithful to a liberal perspective on aid and development and do not articulate a transformative politics. To each of Klees’ four recommendations I would attach the following caveats that offer a distinctly left radical perspective on aid and development. None of these are of course exhaustive of a left radical politics, but are meant merely to illustrate the distance between a liberal perspective and a left radical perspective.

1. Debt cancellation and reparations: In addition to more aid, we need to support political campaigns that call for debt cancellation and a boycott of the foreign debt that is crushing Third World economies. The most recent such call for unconditional debt cancellation has come from a national alliance of political parties, trade unions, and NGOs in Pakistan that oppose more aid as the answer to Pakistan’s economic and humanitarian crisis. The national campaign that held mass rallies in the major cities of Pakistan in September this year also demanded that the government refuse any further loans and only accept grants for infrastructure building

Following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there have been similar calls for Haiti’s debt to be cancelled. A 2004 World Bank/IMF study found that in countries receiving debt relief, poverty reduction initiatives doubled between 1999 and 2004. To cite but a few examples from the report, Tanzania used savings to eliminate school fees, hire more teachers, and build more schools, Burkina Faso drastically reduced the cost of life-saving drugs and increased access to clean water, and Uganda more than doubled school enrollment (see jubileeusa.org).

2. Right to livelihood: Instead of channeling cash directly to poor households, conditional or otherwise, states need to institute a national policy that guarantees livelihood and employment to poor households. In 2005, under the constitutional directive of the Right to
Work, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was enacted as law that entitles every rural household a minimum of 100 days of employment a year at statutory minimum wages. The details of the Act were formulated in consultation with social movement organizations and development economists who inserted terms such as “meaningful employment” and “community development works” as part of the Act. Coupled with the Right to Information Act and social audits where locals examine state allocations and expenditures for rural development programs in their areas, the national employment program has facilitated collective action where locals identify areas of village development on which to work and receive public remuneration for these. In contrast, direct cash transfers continue to privilege the market and individual responsibility, that is, risk is upon the individual beneficiary to make best use of this meager resource. It does not entail state provision for development works, nor does it foster collective action. It is therefore not surprising that Moyo, a neoliberal economist would enthusiastically endorse conditional cash transfers. We live under conditions of predatory capitalism that sanctions “accumulation by dispossession” where the poor are increasingly disposable labor and can be expunged from the economy. The profitability of natural resources such as minerals, oil, water and land are infinitely greater, a reality that is lived by many in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. When the material basis for a decent livelihood and a life of dignity cease to exist, to what ends would the poor utilize their cash benefits? A national public works program like the one I describe above aims to provide stable incomes to poor households and generate collective action on development.

3. Social movements: Participation, I agree, is basic to democratic governance, but here again Klees leaves out mention of social movements that are essential to building robust democracies. The state or other institutions of development are sites where the poor can contest and shape development perspectives only on the basis of strong and dynamic social movements that include labor unions and other mass organizations. Klees recognizes that participation prescribed by official aid institutions is most often instrumental and superficial. It is unclear however how “real and strong participation” in governance can be realized without support for social movements and movement organizations. Social movements and people’s organizations are the only viable mechanisms through which political participation can be mobilized and are necessary elements for a substantive democracy. Whether it is the international Campaign for the Abolition of Third World Debt, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India, or Citizen Schools in Porto Alegre (referenced by Klees), these have come into being on the basis of strong organizing by people’s organizations from the grassroots level to national and international campaigning. Commitment to participation therefore implies solidarity with progressive social movements and people’s struggles to advance conditions for genuine people’s participation in governance and policy making. With increasing reliance on subcontracting to NGOs and private agents, participation in the aid industry is today a highly profitable business. People’s participation is reduced to a mere formality or performance. Therefore one has to look beyond the aid infrastructure for meaningful self-organizing efforts among labor groups, women’s groups, urban dwellers, peasants, teachers, political parties, indigenous struggles, and community organizations, and support these efforts without co-opting them into the aid infrastructure.

4. Bank of the South: Aid has served as a vital tool of foreign policy since the Bretton Woods Institutions came into existence. The powerful mandate and operating structures of the World Bank and the IMF need drastic reform but equally we just as importantly need different lending
institutions that will shift the balance of power between donor and recipient countries. The Bank of the South, founded in 2009 last year with $20 billion in start-up capital by seven South American countries is an attempt to establish a regional development bank that will serve its member countries. It repatriates the capital reserves of these countries held that are in the IMF, World Bank and other foreign banks to a development bank established and controlled by South American nations. We need more such regional partnerships and institutions in the South to emerge that will correct the asymmetrical relationship between First and Third World countries.

The four caveats I outline above help discern between a liberal perspective and a left radical one and also show on occasion the slippage between the liberal and neoliberal perspective on the future of aid and development. The recent financial crisis in the U.S. gives us an invaluable opportunity to question whether sustainable development is a viable project under capitalist economic arrangements and whether participation in the global capitalist market can provide equitable opportunities and security for people in developed and developing economies. Ultimately, the left radical perspective is premised on the hope that capitalism is not the outermost limit of social and political possibility and that something beyond capitalism is not only just possible but also necessary for global social and economic development of the planet. However, the triumph of liberalism symbolizes the impoverishment of the political vision that aspires to and fights for a system something beyond global capitalism is aspired and fought for.

Endnotes
1. Here Klees refers to dependency theorists and anti-colonial writings that saw their heydays from the 1960s-1980s, suggesting that only lone voices, such as those of Joel Samoff and himself, remain.
2. Well known examples are the commentator and New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman and leftist journalist Christopher Hitchens. The entire progressive movement in the U.S. remains muddled in its position on the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the Iraq war was framed as the “bad war” undertaken to defend U.S. national interests rather than putatively democratic ideals, the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been framed as a “good war.” Yet at his West Point speech in 2009, President Obama acknowledged that it is “national interests” that require escalation of U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, and one has to look only at the map to realize that the war effort is for U.S. dominance in the region.
3. Shah (2009) locates this usage as an expression of anti-Marxist tendencies among the U.S. Left and the anti-communist McCarthy era politics when Marxists had to take refuge under the term progressive that accommodated a range of liberals, including free market libertarians and pro-state neoconservatives.
4. The question from a radical left perspective would be: What if the poor agree that what works for them is a social movement to redistribute power and resources? Would that be an incentive for “helpers” to work with “doers” in this project?
5. Resources redistributed to the poor can help re-direct the economy towards their needs and, when combined with job creation efforts, can help set up a self-sustaining system.
6. Article 39 of the Indian constitution urges the State to ensure that “citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to livelihood.” Further, Article 41 stresses that “the State, shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing Right to Work…”
7. India’s national rural employment guarantee program harkens to Roosevelt’s New Deal program of the 1930s where, as a policy response to economic depression, people were employed on “public works” projects such as theaters, libraries, and parks.
References


In his article, “Aid, Development, and Education,” Steve Klees (2010) tells us two stories about foreign aid. The first is that foreign aid does not “work” to alleviate world poverty, no matter whether one takes a neo-Marxist or liberal approach to understanding it. Aid is more about self-interest and geopolitics than anything else – at best it is a form of compensatory legitimation practiced by the world’s richest governments to put a band-aid on inequality. Quoting Joel Samoff, Klees tells us that aid’s “…essential role is not to achieve publicly stated objectives, but rather to maintain a global political economy of inequality” (p. 16).

At the same time, Klees tells us that aid is not “all bad.” It has a progressive and transformative component. If reformed, and revamped, it can serve the common good. More money, provided directly to the poor, getting rid of the World Bank, focusing on key priorities, changing the role of research in the aid regime, and increasing forms of democratic participation and collective agenda setting are all parts of Klees’ remedy.

I want to raise two questions in this response. First, how can we (critical scholars) have it both ways? That is to say, how can development assistance be both a key instrument of unequal social relations and part of a progressive solution? Second, what is missing from Klees’ diagnosis of the aid regime and his prescriptions for aid reform?

What Is Aid Really About?
In the field of comparative education, I would argue that we have (for a very long time) been dominated by a relatively thin description of international political economy when it comes to foreign aid. To unpack foreign aid we need a much more complete theory of world politics and world order, including a basic explanation for the behaviors, motives, and values of key actors within our changing world order that recognizes agency.

Here is what we know. First, foreign aid itself is a phenomenon of the post-World War II era, dominated by the activities of a small number of Western states. In origins and organization, it owes a great deal to the power politics of a bipolar world order that emerged during the Cold War.

At the same time, we would be amiss if we imagined that aid has not also been a product of the evolution of the Western capitalist welfare state and the evolution of a social compact or compromise within those states. Thus while geopolitics and self-interest have been very important in shaping the thematic and geographic allocation of aid, at the same time, certain trends suggest that aid has also reflected the broader process through which capitalist nation states adopted compensatory, Keynesian, or redistributive public policies at home. For example, over time (and with one short period of regression) aid has become more pooled and multilateral, and it has slowly moved towards the provision of enlarged shares to the poorest countries and their poorest populations. Aid to education has also, over the last decade, come to focus more on basic education and on financing the recurrent costs of basic education.
K. Mundy

Klees suggests that one way of understanding aid policies is as a mechanism through which powerful states offset the problems of inequality and legitimate their own power. This is a relatively static and fixed argument; in the end, aid is structurally reduced to motives and incentives that mean it can never rise above being a bandage on human misery.

A second view of the political economy of aid might be to see it as the product of real historical contests among both states and wider social forces in the construction of world order. Such a view might draw upon the ample research tradition that sees the welfare state as the outcome of the organized demands of civil society upon the state. Foreign aid has come to reflect the development of societal compromise or social contracts between citizens and governments within Western welfare states, which are mirrored in global norms and aspirations for achieving equality and social justice through development assistance. Over time, the publics of Western welfare states have come to see foreign aid as a fundamental piece of global redistributive justices – and (especially outside the U.S.) these publics on the whole remain extremely supportive of foreign aid. Development aid may therefore be seen not only as an expression of the ruling elites and their need for “compensatory legitimation,” but also as the result of real pressures from wider social forces for greater and more real equality, domestically and abroad.

This seeming paradox means that in studying foreign aid, our job is a difficult one. We have to ask: what forms of power and self-interest shape the current organization of foreign aid? At the same time, we also need to ask the question: what historical and contemporary levers, and which agents, might drive improvement of foreign aid? Furthermore, what new institutional structures are needed and what barriers to their creation exist? I take this as an underlying part of Klees’ argument, but I think it bears restating in these terms.

**New Features Require New Thinking**

While I agree with many aspects of the arguments Klees puts forward, I want to suggest that new features of the global polity require us to think in new ways about the prospects and purposes of international development aid. In the broadest sense, we need to unpack and examine the motives and incentives behind both official development assistance and the rapid expansion of privately funded development activities. We also need to examine which social forces are most likely to leverage change, and what global institutions or mechanisms are more likely than others to deliver on what Klees calls “transformative” goals, such as the realization of education as a basic human right.

First, we need to acknowledge that history has changed the players and institutions that underlie contemporary forms of development aid. Our story about foreign aid will be too thin if we do not acknowledge that:

- The huge downturn of official (state-provided) development aid in the early 1990s (caused in part by the end of the Cold War), was replaced by a decade of more collective, redistributive approaches to official aid in the period after 1996. While still representing a small “slice” of Western governments, there has been real momentum around the idea of collective action on “education for all” over the past decade to a degree not previously seen in the world system.

- There has been a rapid expansion of private sources of development aid (Severino & Ray, 2010). State monopoly of development aid is a thing of the past, with estimates of upwards of $10 billion provided by international non-governmental organizations in 2006. In the United States alone, recent estimates suggest that private sources of funding for international
development now exceed official (state) provided development aid. Some of these private flows are highly corporatized. However, small-scale philanthropy is also on the rise. For education, such small-scale private giving is particularly extensive: go to any school, faith organization, or community group in North America, for example, and you are likely to find some sort of scholarship or child support effort in action. This implies that there is broad, on-the-ground support for the idea of a global social safety net.

- The diversity of institutional actors doing international development has increased – often in the form of multi-stakeholder partnerships between governments, private philanthropy, and businesses. Klee gives one example of this: the Global Fund. This fund is financed by diverse partners, including Bono’s Red campaign, the Gates Foundation, bilateral and multilateral organizations, and is organized around performance outcomes. We need to ask some hard questions about these new institutionalized “public private” partnerships. Critics have argued that neither GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation) nor the Global Fund are the positive model for participation that Klee implies in his article because they circumvent governments and raise the power of non-state actors with limited accountability to their funders and their “clients” (see for example Garrett, 2007; Doyle & Patel, 2008; and for a larger critique, Scholte, 2005).

- New states are becoming actively involved in development aid, and the center of global power is shifting towards a new group of countries (Steer & Wathne, 2009). The emergence of the G20 is just one feature of this power shift (Kumar, 2010). The rise of China as an aid donor is another (Gu & Messner, 2008; Woods, 2008). We know relatively little about the approach to development or to global institutions that will be taken by these new world powers. But they will certainly reshape the institutions of global governance and the field of educational development over the next decade.

Our old political economy approaches need to be updated to explain the surge of new private and state actors in international development activity. This is no longer a story simply about state power, the power of capital, or compensatory legitimation among states. Systemic critiques of capitalism and states fail to capture the diverse motives and objectives of new actors and actor configurations, and they provide us with few tools or models for understanding points of transformative leverage. Even my own preferred narrative, which revolves around the notion of social forces working to embed redistribution as an important purpose of public policy, seems too thin to be useful.

In this regard, I would like to end by questioning two of the remedies offered by Klee: “participation” and getting rid of the World Bank.

What we have seen over the past decade is a massive growth in the “participation” of voluntary actors in the field of international development. Yet despite this development, we’ve done relatively little in our field to specify what transparency, accountability, and deep levels of public engagement look like for transnational and local non-state actors, and how (in an ideal world order) these actors should relate to democratic and representative institutions of governance. It seems to me that private efforts of all kinds (from individual voluntary giving to corporate philanthropy) need to be better coordinated, regulated, and embedded within representative democratic structures – moving from the community, to the state, to the regional and transnational (with overlaps in between). “Participation” is no quick fix, if what we mean by this is the construction of a new social contract among the world’s citizens and their governments at these different scales.
Getting rid of the World Bank is a call that may have important rhetorical value: over the past two decades, it has clearly helped advocates and campaigners to highlight the major faults within that institution. But in a time of major economic crisis, and given the huge shifts in the key actors within the international development regime, I believe it is irresponsible to call for the end of one institution without careful modeling and debate about alternative architectures for delivering on the promise of a global social contract. In the meantime, we should ask ourselves: do we really believe that contemporary world powers and other key development stakeholders (such as corporate NGOs and large foundations, like Gates) are likely to replace the Bank with something that is dramatically better? Or is the more likely outcome an even more chaotic and divided arena for delivering on global education for all promises, with many vertical funds and multi-stakeholder partnerships, and no anchoring institution that we can hold responsible for delivering a global social contract? To give it credit, the Bank remains among the most transparent and accountable of our international institutions (see the analysis provided by Easterly and Pfutze, 2008); it provides more direct budget support that any other aid provider; and, because of its direct relationship with the IMF and ministries of finance around the world, it has the ability to advocate for education and other social expenditure more forcefully than any other existing global institution. It also offers an important focal point for efforts to influence and socialize new global governors – such as China, now the Bank’s second largest shareholder (Woods, 2008).

Like Klees, I do not believe that more aid – or even more effective aid – should be our sole objective when we think about reforming the current international development regime. However, if our ultimate objective is a world order characterized by democratic forms of governance that scale up to act as both anchor and lever for a new global social contract, we have a great deal of further thinking to do. Hortatory calls for participation, and “50 years is enough” simply won’t get us there. As starting points, we will need a much thicker description of international political economy, including new state and non-state actors. We will also need to pay much greater attention to modeling alternative institutions for an emergent world polity.

Endnotes
1. As an example, the Global Fund has been criticized for funding initiatives that bypass both UN organizations and governments. They have been accused of tilting health spending towards non-state service provision (Doyle & Patel, 2008; Rivishankar et al., 2009; Sagorsky, 2010).

References


Paradoxes and Prospects


Reply

Towards a Progressive View of Aid, Development, and Education

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I feel honored and privileged that the editors of Current Issues in Comparative Education decided to solicit responses to my article in this volume (Klees, 2010) and that the responses were by such thoughtful and well-regarded scholars. While there are areas of disagreement, I find that our disagreements are much less important than our commonalities. I try to detail both in my reply, but I focus on how my respondents and I share what I call a progressive perspective – even though none of them choose that particular label to describe their point of view. The meaning of a progressive perspective necessarily reflects a struggle over theory and praxis. It is constantly being formed and re-formed. The debate in this issue is part of that struggle.

Beyond Economics
Brehm and Silova’s (2010) intriguing “radical reimagination” of aid argues that the “central discourse on international aid has been dominated by” economists’ viewpoints and that my paper is no exception. In my paper, I did not have space enough to do more than a thumbnail sketch of the neoliberal, liberal, and progressive perspectives I used to frame the discussion of aid, education, and development. The progressive perspective, which I favor and which formed the basis for my recommendations, is not an economics perspective but a remarkable confluence of interrelated critical theories and perspectives that cross disciplines and applied fields, including: dependency, world systems, critical, neomarxist, economic reproduction, cultural reproduction, resistance, feminist standpoint, gender and development, socialist feminist, critical race, queer, intersection, critical postmodern, poststructural, postcolonial, and critical pedagogy. And this does not include all the related critical theories within each social science and applied field.

I am not saying that these theories offer identical perspectives, just that they share essential commonalities with respect to addressing the two major questions social theories face: “How do we understand our social world?” and “What can we do to change it?” In terms of understanding the world, most fundamentally, all these theories focus on marginalization. They see the world as composed of systems and structures that maintain, reproduce, and legitimate existing inequalities. From these perspectives, inequalities are not system failures but the logical consequence of successful system functioning. In terms of what to do, while most of these theories recognize that reproduction is pervasive, they also agree that there are serious challenges to reproduction. There is general agreement that those challenges have two interrelated sources. One is that the systems and structures that dominate are not monolithic but are pervaded by contradictions, such as that between the stated value of political democracy and the reality of economic authoritarianism, or that between the stated value of human equality and the reality of systematic inequity and discrimination. The other is a belief in human agency, in that oppression can be recognized and fought individually and collectively (see Klees, 2008b, for more details).

Brehm and Silova paint a picture of the progressive paradigm as no different than the neoliberal or liberal. To the contrary, most progressives would agree with the important points Brehm and
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Silova make in their article. For example, they argue that equality must be the starting point for a new aid relationship, but:

[similar] to conservative efforts of education reform, critical pedagogy continues to see inequality as ‘a taken-for-granted, even obvious state of affairs to be confronted by the right mixtures of policies and praxis’ (Friedrich, Jaasted, & Popkewitz, 2010, p. 573). Ironically, it is this belief in the human ability to manage inequality that creates such stark similarities between the neoliberal, liberal, and progressive paradigms. (Brehm and Silova, 2010, p. 29)

While, at first glance, this may seem accurate in that all three paradigms recognize the existence of inequality, the progressive paradigm clearly recognizes the “equality of intelligence” and humanity that Brehm and Silova emphasize as essential. Paulo Freire, in developing critical pedagogy, clearly recognized the essential equality of teacher and student (Freire, 2005). And a progressive perspective does not see a “human ability to manage inequality,” but rather a struggle by those who are marginalized and their allies to confront inequality.

Similarly, Brehm and Silova (2010) paint an inaccurate portrait of a progressive paradigm on other important dimensions. First, they accuse it of “an unrelenting assumption that international development is linear, based on rationality and progressing towards a ‘better’ world for all” (p. 29). If anything, the progressive paradigm sees the exact opposite; capitalist development is not at all linear and is certainly not progressing towards a better world for all. Second, Brehm and Silova see in the progressive paradigm a “focus on education, empowerment, and participation as the means (not the ends) of international development initiatives” (p. 30). Again, the opposite is true for most progressives – education, empowerment, and participation are seen as important development ends. The boxes we use to classify perspectives are always problematic and it is easy to create straw persons. Brehm and Silova offer us some thoughtful perspectives on what is needed, but they should not be so quick to discard perspectives that complement theirs.

Capitalism and Development

Ginsburg (2010) faults me for not focusing on capitalism and for not sufficiently problematizing “development.” I agree. The term “development” or “developing” too often implies we are on a linear path to progress when we are far from that (as above). These terms are too often used in a narrow way to focus on economic growth. Ginsburg suggests that “one might want to try to rescue the term by referencing social democratic, socialist, eco-feminist, or sustainable human rights-based development” (p. 35). Other possibilities include participatory or local development. Each of these terms captures elements from a progressive paradigm to qualify “development” but each has baggage of its own. For the present I use the term “development” because there are no good substitutes, but it always needs to be qualified.

The world system of capitalism is central to the problems facing development (Wallerstein, 1984). Capitalism is by no means our only problem. Patriarchy, racism and ethnic prejudice and hatred, heterosexism and homophobia, ableism, and other structures that support inequality and inhumanity intertwine. But capitalism is fundamentally different in at least one way. The other structures I mention are widely recognized as unfair, as violating human rights. On the other hand, capitalism, throughout much of the world, gets good press. Schoolchildren are taught its virtues. Ideologues portray it as the “one best system,” as the culminating point of history.

In my paper, when I talked of neoliberalism, I was talking about what has been dominant the
last 30 years, neoliberal capitalism (Klees, 2008a), and when I was talking about liberalism, I was talking about liberal capitalism that was dominant in many places from the 1930s to the 1970s. Some progressives, dismayed by the human and environmental destruction and inequalities associated with neoliberal capitalism, look to a return to the liberal past, with more attention to inequality and the necessity for the State to put limits on capitalism. But inequalities were rampant during the liberal era; the difference between liberal and neoliberal capitalism was more rhetoric than reality. As I implied above, under capitalism, poverty, inequality, and environmental destruction are not failures of the capitalist system, as they are usually seen. Instead, they are logical consequences of the system, the results of a well-functioning successful system. One might argue that, contrary to the ideologues, capitalism is one of the most inefficient political economic systems in history. In today’s world, there are probably much more than two billion people who are unemployed or underemployed, living at the margins of our society. Capitalism is unable to create the opportunities that could make all these people an integral and valued part of our society, to the benefit of us all.

Ginsburg (2010) captures some of these issues in his wonderful game metaphor, contrasting winner-take-all Monopoly with his invented game, Utopia, which would “identify and mobilize all players’ abilities to participate collectively in determining” needs (p. 36). In a Utopian world, Ginsburg goes on to say, “some of what is termed ‘development assistance’ or ‘aid’ – helping people to meet their needs and realize their rights – would become core activities of the system” (p. 36). While many would consider Ginsburg’s version of Utopia an impossibility, there are many analyses and examples of how we are moving in that direction (Broad & Cavanagh, 2009; Hahnel, 2005; Alperovitz, 2004). I do not mean to be sanguine about the future as Ginsburg charges me. I said that the continuing global economic crisis raises further questions about the legitimacy of the capitalist system, but Ginsburg is correct that capitalism has faced and weathered many crises. Nonetheless, I am an optimist in that over time I see more and more people around the world striving to find and implement better alternatives.

Progressive versus Left Radical Perspectives?
Kamat (2010) begins by saying that: “In fact, there is very little I disagree with in terms of the content of his [my] essay” (p. 43). I would say the same about her essay. What Kamat offers is a much deeper analysis of what a progressive or (as she calls it) “left radical” perspective means and what it implies for social transformation. In part, we have a difference of terminology, one that Kamat considers important. She, and some of the authors whom she cites, equates a progressive perspective with a liberal one. And indeed, today in the U.S. some liberals, President Obama being a very visible example, have taken to calling themselves progressives, given the neoliberal attack on the label “liberal.” Nonetheless, the term “progressive” has a long historical lineage referring to more radical left views, and, as I indicated in the opening of this reply, I intended to use it in that way. Indeed, I made clear in my original article (Klees, 2010) that I was referring to much more than liberal versions of so-called progressive politics. I said:

a progressive perspective focuses on the reproductive nature of both the market and the State under current world system structures like capitalism, patriarchy, and racism, and puts greater reliance on transformation from below through more participatory forms of democracy and collective action. (p. 15)

Thus, I see Kamat adding to my argument more than offering a different direction. As I said, I don’t disagree with the tenor of her argument, just with some of the details. Kamat objects to my finding some progressive elements in Ellerman (2005) and Riddell’s (2007) books, and she makes
some good points. But Ellerman’s critique of the World Bank and development and his respect for autonomy of those who are marginalized are not standard liberal fare, nor is Riddell’s radical reconstruction of aid architecture.

Kamat (2010) spends some time elucidating the limitations of cash transfers to the poor, dismissing it as “distributing largesse” (p. 44). Admittedly, aid as largesse by the wealthy underlies neoliberal and liberal perspectives, and goes against the “equality” framework of Brehm and Silova, the “utopian” framework of Ginsburg, and the progressive/left radical framework of Kamat and myself. But that does not mean we should shut aid down nor not try to distribute aid in different forms. From a progressive perspective, today’s gross inequalities of wealth are illegitimate – a result of colonialism, neocolonialism, unfair trade, and vastly unequal distribution of resources – and aid and cash transfers should be a right as long as the world system remains so unequal. In Brazil’s large-scale cash transfer programs, often upheld as a model, were the result of struggle by social movements that elected Lula as president and pushed for such policies, not largesse by the rich (Avritzer, 2009).

Kamat pushes for transformation that goes beyond aid policies. I agree, and I also did so in terms of arguing for participation as central, agreeing on certain development priorities, eliminating the World Bank and the IMF, and rethinking the over-emphasis on research (Klees, 2010). Kamat adds four considerations. First, the need for debt cancellation (which could be seen as largesse or the result of struggle). Second, the “right to livelihood.” I have long argued that we will never have Education for All without Jobs for All (Klees, 2008b). Ginsburg points out how this right is central in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. It is this right that is most destructive of the capitalist order which cannot and will not provide sustainable livelihoods for all. Third, Kamat points to the example of the Bank of the South as an alternative to the World Bank and IMF. Fourth, she argues that social movements are central to these and other attempts at social transformation. I agree that these four points are important, but others could be added. There is no blueprint for what a progressive world beyond capitalism might look like. From a progressive framework, we need both to envision alternatives and to struggle to collectively transform our world.

The Reality of Aid

Mundy (2010) questions my analysis when she asks how I and other critical scholars, herself included, can have it both ways. That is, “how can development assistance be both a key instrument of unequal social relations and part of a progressive solution?” (p. 49). But this is what contradictions are all about. Mundy seems to fault me for suggesting that:

one way of understanding aid policies is as a mechanism through which powerful states...legitimate their own power...; in the end, aid is structurally reduced to motives and incentives that mean it can never rise above being a bandage on human misery. (p. 50)

This is true, but only in part. In my paper, I am careful to point out that while reproduction of the social order is a strong feature of aid:

I am a firm believer that neoliberal policies are continually challenged by individuals, organizations, social movements, and left-of-center governments. The existence of aid and the MDGs represent real gains for the world’s disenfranchised, as does, for example, the more participatory processes called for in PRSPs. However, in
this neoliberal era, these policies unfortunately bear little fruit. (Klees, 2010, p. 16)

In the end, Mundy (2010) seems to agree with me:

Development aid may therefore be seen not only as an expression of the ruling elites and their need for ‘compensatory legitimation,’ but also as the result of real pressures from wider social forces for greater and more real equality, domestically and abroad. (p. 50)

Mundy also argues that “to unpack foreign aid we need a much more complete theory of world politics and world order” (p. 49). In this regard, she signals the rise of “private sources of development aid,” new institutional actors such as the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and new State actors such as China. I agree these are important developments but they are well-known and do not change my analysis or the recommendations I drew from my analysis. In response to my using the Global Fund as an example of alternative mechanisms Mundy points to problems with the Global Fund’s circumvention of government and its raising “the power of non-state actors with limited accountability to their funders” (p. 51). But those same weaknesses also embody strengths such as allowing for a more prominent role for civil society organizations and developing new approaches to accountability. A new and transformed world order needs new development mechanisms, and the Global Fund is one result of needed struggle and experimentation.

This last topic relates closely to Mundy’s final comments that question two of my recommendations – the call for stronger forms of participation and the replacement of the World Bank and the IMF. We may not disagree about participation. Mundy’s principal point is that what participation means in practice needs to pay attention to how it relates to “democratic and representative institutions of governance” (p. 51). I agree but would point out that how state and non-state actors relate is not decided by some rational allocation of roles, but rather reflects popular struggles for power and rights. Mundy also points out that participation is no “quick fix,” which is certainly true (p. 51).

Where Mundy and I disagree is over the elimination of the Bank and the Fund. From my perspective, she offers a series of invalid excuses for maintaining the status quo: we are in a “major economic crisis;” given “contemporary world powers” it would be unlikely to replace the Bank with something “dramatically better;” and the Bank should be lauded for its transparency and accountability, its ability to deliver a “global social contract,” and its advocacy for education. To the contrary, we are always in one sort of economic crisis or another and the Bank and the Fund follow neoliberal policies that resolve the crisis in the interests of the advantaged. It has been more than 60 years since the Bretton Woods agreement that created the Bank and the Fund. As Mundy would admit, we have a totally different world polity and social ethos. A new Bretton Woods conference would have a large array of new actors at the table with new perspectives on economics and aid. The struggle to define these new institutions would involve these new actors and could result in new institutions much more favorable to the developing world.

Also, contrary to Mundy’s assertion, the Bank has very limited transparency and accountability. In whose interests is the social contract it delivers, and where has its advocacy for education gotten us? What kind of education and for whom? The goals of Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals will need to be postponed once again, for decades, if we proceed with business as usual. Moreover, education under the aegis of the Bank is dominated by exceedingly narrow
goals and measures. I pointed out in my paper how the Bank and the Fund – according to their own staff – are run by their neoliberal “thought police.” This is well-known to any longtime observer of these institutions. How can we possibly continue to have confidence in these institutions, which are run by one aberrant sect’s thought police? Mundy argues it is “irresponsible” to call for the replacement of these institutions without an alternative architecture in place. To the contrary, it is irresponsible to continue to support such ideological and problematic institutions.

Conclusion
While some could see much of this debate as semantics, it is not. The issue of whether we label our critique as progressive, left radical, or anti-capitalist is minor; it is the substance of the critique that matters, and the perspectives above combine to flesh out a profound critique of and alternative directions for our world system. These debates are not just about aid and education. They are about what kind of world do we now have, what kind of world do we want, and how can we get there.

The deprivations endured every day by so many mark how primitive and uncivilized we are. Savage and illegitimate income and wealth differences, determined principally by an accident of birth, decide who survives and how well. Future historians, if humanity manages to survive the profound crises we face, will look back at us and shake their heads in collective disgust at how so much knowledge could have been used so poorly. We have the resources and knowledge needed to transform our world system now, not in 30, 50, 100 years. We need to work on the politics.

Endnotes
1. I used the term “political economy” instead of “economics” to refer to all three perspectives. Even neoliberal and liberal political economy perspectives have cultural, political, and social dimensions in addition to economic ones.
2. Brehm and Silova question why I note that development should not become a strictly local phenomenon. The answer is that with 6+ billion people on the planet filled with technologies with pervasive impacts, the local and the global are inextricably intertwined. We can no more leave development to the local than we can to the global.
3. A new Bretton Woods conference could easily design an alternative architecture. I do not mean by this to say an alternative architecture will be easily agreed upon, since it will rightly be the object of considerable struggle between alternative political and economic views. But designing and implementing an alternative to the Bank and the Fund is an essential element in transforming our world system.

References


For its Spring 2011 issue (Volume 13, Issue 2), the editors of Current Issues in Comparative Education are soliciting submissions on evaluation and assessment in schooling. Evaluation, assessment, and testing have been an important, not to say, controversial, part of education for as long as educators have attempted to find out if their students have learned what they intended to teach them. Beyond their everyday, situational use in verbal question-and-answer sessions within the course of a class exercise, most attention has been concentrated on the efficacy of the more formal, usually written form of state or national testing used as a benchmark within individual school systems. Further, the growth of internationally comparative tests such as TIMMS and PISA have been fueled by an increasingly globalized world in education, one in which teachers, systems, and countries borrow and attempt to learn from each other in the hope of finding better ways to determine if students have actually learned. CICE is interested to find out the state of evaluation, assessment, and testing around the world.

Possible topics include the uses of evaluation, assessment, and/or testing in student populations; testing for teacher effectiveness; use in ‘high stakes’ environments which could include high stakes for students, teachers, or administrators; or global analyses of testing. Other topics might include analyses of cross-national comparisons or the ‘portability’ of scores from one system to another. The growth in international schools over the last twenty years may have produced research on the different perspectives held by national/public schools and international/private institutions. Is testing utilized or valued differently in different contexts and what are the results of these different perspectives? Are there different applications of evaluation, assessment, and testing in developed nations as compared to the practices in developing nations? What forms do these practices take when instituted by foreign educational development as a result of global initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or Education for All (EFA)?

While most submissions are likely to be quantitative or data-driven, we also welcome conceptual analyses of evaluation, assessment, and testing, particularly as they are seen in different contexts – such as the different forms (oral, written, visual) they may take within/at the end of individual lessons or learning situations, as well as in the more obvious form of whole-school and nationwide exercises – as representative or adequate measurements of learning. Such articles could question the efficacy of cross-national comparisons of testing data (i.e. PISA, TIMMS, etc.), or question their use in high stakes, summative judgments of learning or teaching (as opposed to instructional practice aids as formative judgments). Others might examine how evaluation, assessment, and testing are conceived; where some systems might see synonyms, others might see three different processes with different purposes and applications. Additionally, submissions are not restricted only to scholars in the field of comparative and international education, but those from other disciplines (i.e. Anthropology, History, Philosophy, Sociology, to name only a few) conducting research in the field are welcome to submit as well.

Submission Deadline: March 1, 2011

For more information, go to: http://www.tc.edu/cice/Main_Pages/call_for_papers.html.